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DIVERSIFICATION OF THE JAPANESE JUDICIARY
Daniel H. Foote†
Abstract: Japan has a career judiciary. The Courts Act of 1947 provides that
judges may be appointed from among prosecutors, attorneys, and law professors. In
practice, however, the vast majority of judges come from a fourth category, “assistant
judges,” who are appointed directly upon completion of the legal training program and
typically serve through retirement. This continues a career tradition that dates back to the
late nineteenth century. For nearly that long, the Japanese bar has been advocating that the
career system should be abolished and that a substantial portion of the judiciary, if not all
judges, should be drawn from among experienced attorneys.
The Justice System Reform Council (“JSRC”), which met from 1999 through 2001,
strongly endorsed the importance of diversification of the judiciary, and set forth a
two-pronged proposal for achieving that goal: 1) establishing a system through which
assistant judges would “leave their status as judges” and “gather diversified experience”
outside the judiciary and 2) promoting increased hiring of experienced attorneys and others
to the bench. Utilizing the framework for analyzing court reform set forth by Malcolm
Feeley in his classic work, Court Reform on Trial: Why Simple Solutions Fail, this Article
examines the various efforts at diversification of the Japanese judiciary, with a special focus
on the most recent set of reforms.
Cite as: Daniel H. Foote, East Asian Court Reform on Trial: Diversification of the Japanese
Judiciary, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 7 (2017).

INTRODUCTION

I.

†

Professor of Law, The University of Tokyo, and Senior Advisor, Asian Law Center, University of
Washington School of Law.
I have benefited from presentations and discussions regarding this topic at several sessions of the
Citizens’ Council (Shimin Kaigi, 市民会議) for the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (“JFBA”), and from
helpful feedback following presentations at: 3rd Year Training Program for Assistant Judges, Legal Training
and Research Institute, Japan, March 2008; Meeting of Japanese American Bar Association, Los Angeles,
CA, October 2009; Conference: Decision Making on the Japanese Supreme Court, Washington University
School of Law, St. Louis, MO, September 2010; Asian Law Lecture Series, University of Washington School
of Law, Seattle, WA, October 2014; and Panel, East Asian Court Reform on Trial, Law & Society Association
Annual Meeting, New Orleans, LA, June 2016. Above all, I have benefited from having had the opportunity to
serve on the Committee to Evaluate Attorneys Seeking Appointment to Judicial Positions for the Daini (No. 2)
Tokyo Bar Association, from the inception of that Committee in 2002 through 2014. Portions of my research
were supported by the following grants, for which I wish to express my gratitude: Japan Society for the
Promotion of Science (“JSPS”), Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research, Base Studies C, No. 21530103
(Reexamination of the Substance and Process of Justice System Reform); JSPS, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific
Research, Base Studies A, No. 25245002 (Empirical Research on Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes);
and the Foundation for Research in Civil Dispute Resolution (Lawyers in Every Corner of Society?).
Notes regarding formatting and translations: For cites to works published in English, I have used the
name order that appears in the publication. Otherwise, for Japanese names I have followed the order normally
used in Japan: i.e., family name first, followed by given name. Except as otherwise indicated, all translations
are by me.
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Among the recent reforms to the Japanese judicial system, the lay
participation (裁 判 員, saiban’in) system for criminal cases has received the
lion’s share of attention.1 Yet that is by no means the only noteworthy recent
reform. The final report of the Justice System Reform Council (“Reform
Council” or “JSRC”), issued in 2001,2 contained recommendations for a wide
range of other changes to the judicial system, many of which resulted in
concrete reforms.3 There were two sets of proposals related to the judicial
appointment process: recommendations aimed at “diversifying” the judiciary4
and at “reflecting the views of the public in appointment of judges.”5 This
Article focuses primarily on the former set of reforms. As we will see,
however, the latter set of reforms also comes into play.6
This Article uses Malcom Feeley’s framework for analyzing court
reform, set out in his classic work Court Reform on Trial: Why Simple
Solutions Fail,7 to evaluate the Japanese reform attempt. To summarize that
framework briefly, Feeley identifies the following five stages in the process of
judicial reform: 1) diagnosis or conception; 2) initiation; 3) implementation;
4) routinization; and 5) evaluation. As its name implies, the diagnosis or
conception stage involves “the process of identifying problems and

The works in English on the lay participation system include at least four books (ANNA
DOBROVALSKAIA, THE DEVELOPMENT OF JURY SERVICE IN JAPAN (2016); DIMITRI VANOVERBEKE, JURIES IN
THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY
(2015); ANDREW W ATSON, POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN JAPANESE CRIMINAL JUSTICE: FROM JURORS TO LAY
JUDGES (2016); M ATTHEW J. WILSON, HIROSHI FUKURAI & TAKASHI MARUTA, JAPAN AND CIVIL JURY
TRIALS: THE CONVERGENCE OF FORCES (2015)), along with many articles. The list of works in Japanese
would run several pages.
2
SHIHŌ SEIDO KAIKAKU SHINGIKAI (司法制度改革審議会) [JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL],
SHIHŌ SEIDO KAIKAKU SHINGIKAI IKENSHO – 21 SEIKI NO NIHON O SASAERU SHIHŌ SEIDO (司法制度改革審
議会意見書 — 21 世紀の日本を支える司法制度) [RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM
COUNCIL – FOR A JUSTICE SYSTEM TO SUPPORT J APAN IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY] (June 12, 2001)
[hereinafter JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS] http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/report-dex.html (Japanese);
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html (English).
3
For an overview of the JSRC and its impact, see Daniel H. Foote, Introduction and Overview:
Japanese Law at a Turning Point, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT xix, xx-xxxv (Daniel H. Foote ed.,
2007) (hereinafter A TURNING POINT).
4
JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, Ch. III, pt. 5, § 1.
5
Id. at Ch. III, pt. 5, § 2.
6
For an examination of the reforms aimed at reflecting public views and securing transparency in the
judiciary’s personnel process, see Daniel H. Foote, The Supreme Court and the Push for Transparency in
Lower Court Appointments in Japan, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1745, 1745–63 (2011) [hereinafter Foote,
Transparency]. For a discussion of both sets of reforms at an earlier stage, see Daniel H. Foote, Recent
Reforms to the Japanese Judiciary: Real Change or Mere Appearance?, 66 HŌSHAKAIGAKU (法社会学)
128–61 (2007) [hereinafter Foote, Recent Reforms].
7
MALCOLM A. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL 35–37 (1983).
1
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considering solutions.”8 During the initiation stage, “new functions are added
or practices are significantly altered. This stage requires several decisions,
[including]: Which of several alternatives will be adopted?” 9 The
implementation stage “involves staffing, clarifying goals, and adapting to a
new environment. Ultimately, it is the task of translating abstract goals into
practical policies.”10 As to the routinization stage, Feeley explains, “Unless a
program is intended to be temporary or a single-shot effort, sooner or later it
must be routinized . . . . Ultimately, the success of an innovation must be
judged by how it performs under this routine rather than under its initial
conditions.”11 Finally, with respect to evaluation, Feeley observes that “new
programs are usually assessed during their experimental (the first three) stages
rather than their routine periods (the fourth stage).” He adds: “While such
evaluations can tell us something about whether an idea can or cannot work, it
tells us next to nothing about whether it will work. Little is known about the
eventual, routine performance of new programs . . . .”12
After setting forth these five stages in the Introduction to his book,
Feeley identifies several characteristics of institutions in which “change is
most likely to succeed.” These characteristics include: the existence of highly
trained professionals with diffused and flexible authority, broad and adaptable
duties, and flexible roles and mobility. 13 Then, following a detailed
examination of several concrete court reform efforts in the United States,
Feeley sets forth an even longer list of “impediments to change.”14 I will
discuss Feeley’s impediments to change more extensively in Part VI.B. below
during my assessment of the extent to which those factors apply in the context
of the recent Japanese efforts at diversification of the judiciary. To provide a
brief summary here, the impediments identified by Feeley in the United States
context include: a lack of a sense of historical perspective in the diagnosis or
conception stage; 15 the role of outsiders in the reform efforts, especially
relevant at the initiation stage;16 the problems of fragmentation, newness, and
premature judgment at the implementation stage; 17 factors such as loss of
momentum, co-optation and adaptation leading to backsliding at the
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Id.
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id. at 37.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 38.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 192–93.
Id. at 196–97.
Id. at 197–200.
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routinization stage; 18 and problems such as lack of incentive for rigorous
assessment, manipulation, and distortion at the evaluation stage.19
With this overview of Feeley’s framework, let us turn to the main focus
of this essay: efforts at diversification of the Japanese judiciary. In the
Japanese context, the concept of “diversity” in judiciary refers not to race,
gender, or ideology, but to diversity in background and experiences. As a
reflection of this mindset, the Reform Council stressed the importance of
securing judges “with abundant, diversified knowledge and experience.” 20
These recommendations, in turn, relate to the traditional structure of the
Japanese judiciary, in which most judges spend their entire careers within the
judiciary.
The theme of diversification of the judiciary, as thus defined, is by no
means new to Japan. To the contrary, utilizing the Feeley framework, one can
point to at least six distinct periods of diagnosis or conception, dating back
over a century. These include at least two earlier instances of initiation and
implementation of efforts to promote diversification. As we will see, those
prior efforts did not result in major changes to the dominant career pattern.
Some fifteen years have now passed since the latest set of reforms entered the
implementation stage. Thus, the system is well into what Feeley characterized
as the routinization phase, and is ripe for evaluation.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE PREWAR PERIOD

II.

Prior to the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the system of courts in Japan was
highly decentralized. 21 Soon after the Ministry of Justice (“MOJ”) was
established in 1871, it set up a centralized nationwide court system.22 Initially,
Id. at 200–02.
Id. at 202–05.
20
JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, Ch. III, pt. 5, § 1.
21
As outlined in HIRAMATSU YOSHIRŌ (平松義郎), KINSEI KEIJI SOSHŌHŌ NO KENKYŪ (近世刑事訴
訟法の研究) [RESEARCH INTO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW IN THE MODERN ERA] (1960), as translated and
summarized in Yoshirō Hiramatsu, Summary of Tokugawa Criminal Justice, 22 L. IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 105
(Daniel H. Foote ed., trans., 1989). The Tokugawa shogunate and each of the feudal domains had their own
court systems based on territorial principles; there were separate court systems for shrines, temples, and
certain other organized bodies.
22
With respect to the prewar system, see, e.g., Takaaki Hattori, The Legal Profession in Japan: Its
Historical Development and Present State, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 110,
110–17, 119–24 (Arthur T. von Mehren ed., 1963) [hereinafter LEGAL ORDER]; John O. Haley, The Japanese
Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy, and the Public Trust, in A TURNING POINT, supra note 3, at 99,
115–17; ROKUMOTO KAHEI (六本佳平), NIHON NO HŌ TO SHAKAI（日本の法と社会）[J APANESE LAW AND
SOCIETY] 175–79 (2004); KANEKO HAJIME ＆ TAKESHITA MORIO （金子一＆竹下守夫）, SAIBANHŌ （裁
18
19
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there were no specified minimum qualifications, and most judges were
appointed from among administrative officials.23 From 1884, however, newly
appointed judges were required to meet one of three criteria: possession of a
law degree, qualification as a daigennin (代言人, legal advocate; predecessor
to the bengoshi （弁護士, attorney), or passage of a special examination for
appointment of judges.24
In 1890, the first comprehensive court law was enacted.25 Article 58 of
that law, the Court Organization Act, provided that candidates for the judiciary
and procuracy must pass the examination mentioned above, then complete
three years of training (later reduced to one and a half years) in either courts or
prosecutors’ offices. 26 Candidates then were required to pass a second
examination prior to appointment. 27 Those who had served as imperial
university professors or as bengoshi for at least three years were eligible for
appointment without taking the exam or the training.28
Despite the exceptions authorizing appointment of professors and
attorneys, the judiciary soon evolved into a career system. As of 1892, former
officials from the MOJ and other administrative agencies still accounted for
nearly half the judges, but over forty percent had already entered through the
examination route. Notably, only one of the 1255 judges had been appointed
from among the ranks of legal advocates.29 By 1900, “nearly all” of Japan’s
judges “had been selected through the process” set out in the Court
Organization Act.30 According to that Act, judges served for life,31 although a
later amendment established a mandatory retirement age, normally
sixty-three.32 Throughout the prewar period, judges and prosecutors were
判法）[COURTS LAW] 49–59 (4th ed. 2002).
23
Hattori, supra note 22, at 114.
24
ROKUMOTO, supra note 22, at 176.
25
Saibansho Kōsei Hō (裁判所構成法) [Court Organization Act], Act No. 6 of 1890.
26
Id. art. 58 (reduced to one and a half years pursuant to amendment in Act No. 10 of 1908).
27
Graduates of imperial universities were exempted from the first exam but not the second. Id. art.
65(2).
28
Id. art. 65(1). The Court Organization Act expressly used the term bengoshi, even though the
Attorneys Act establishing that position and title was not enacted until three years later (Act No. 7 of 1893).
The original bill for the Attorneys Act had been prepared in 1890. Its passage was delayed by opposition from
daigennin; following revisions, it was enacted in 1893. Hattori, supra note 22, at 126.
29
Id. at 121 n.36. Nearly ten percent held jurisprudence degrees from domestic or foreign universities.
30
Haley, supra note 22, at 115.
31
Saibansho Kōsei Hō [Court Organization Act], Act No. 6 of 1890, art. 67.
32
Id. art. 74-2 (added by amendment, pursuant to Act No. 101 of 1921). The one exception to the
retirement age of 63 was the president of the highest court, the Daishin’in, who served until 65. Judges
retained their status for life.
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frequently recruited to administrative positions in the MOJ. 33 Moreover,
within the career judiciary, judges faced transfers and promotions on a
periodic basis, decisions over which the Minister of Justice had authority.34
While considerable mobility between the judiciary and procuracy existed
during the early years,35 after the passage of the Court Organization Act in
1890 movement between the two branches was rare. 36 The two tracks
diverged; the judiciary and the procuracy each became firmly established as
“elite professional bureaucracies.”37
Notably, these two tracks diverged even more greatly from a third track:
that of attorneys. By 1880, attorneys were required to pass a nationwide
examination to register as daigennin.38 The passage of the Attorneys Act
(Bengoshihō) in 1893 was part of an effort to increase professionalization and
raise the status of the bar. These efforts included the new title bengoshi, along
with a new examination system. 39 For the next thirty years, however, the
examination for attorneys was conducted separately from that for prospective
judges and prosecutors.40 Although the examinations were combined in 1923,
the career tracks remained separate. Until 1933, no additional training was
required for those who became bengoshi. Even after a training requirement
was added, training for attorneys was separate from training for judges and
prosecutors, under the auspices of each local bar association.41 Thus, by the
early twentieth century the pattern of separation of the legal profession into
three separate tracks (referred to in Japan as hōsō sansha （法曹三者, the
“three branches of the legal profession”) had taken firm root.
The insulation of the judicial and prosecutorial tracks from the attorney
track did not go unnoticed. As early as 1890, daigennin had begun urging the
Hattori, supra note 22, at 125.
See, e.g., id. at 123 (pursuant to art. 73 of the Court Organization Act, judges could not be removed to
a different office or court against their will. However, it appears to have been taken for granted that judges
would accept changes in their postings without protest).
35
Haley, supra note 22, at 115–16.
36
Id.; Hattori, supra note 22, at 125.
37
Haley, supra note 22, at 115.
38
See, e.g., Hattori, supra note 22, at 118–19; DARRYL E. FLAHERTY, PUBLIC LAW, PRIVATE PRACTICE:
POLITICS, PROFIT, AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY JAPAN 115–18, 207–09 (2013).
39
Hattori, supra note 22, at 126–27.
40
Id. at 127–28.
41
Id. at 128 n.65, 137–38 n.110. In many regions, the training system remained largely undeveloped by
the time World War II started. In another difference that has taken on considerable significance in recent
debates over the legal training process, at that time the attorney trainees were not paid, unlike the judge and
prosecutor trainees, who were regarded essentially as apprentice civil servants and received regular stipends.
Id. at 138 n.111.
33
34
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MOJ to appoint judges and prosecutors from among their ranks.42 Following
passage of the Attorneys Act, bengoshi began to take up the call. By the turn
of the century, organizations of attorneys had begun to push for judges to be
hired from among practicing lawyers, under the slogan hōsō ichigen (法曹一
元).43 That term literally means “unification of the legal profession.” It has
been used in various senses, including, at its broadest, simply a shared
awareness of attorneys, judges and prosecutors as being members of the same
profession. More commonly, it is used to describe the view that judges should
be selected from experienced members of the bar, as is the case in
Anglo-American legal systems.44 That same slogan has continued to animate
calls for reform to the judicial appointment process ever since. Accordingly,
one can point all the way back to the late 1800s as an initial instance of
diagnosis or conception of the issue. Even though the slogan has remained
identical, motivations have shifted. At that time and for many years thereafter,
the major objective was raising the status of attorneys, rather than diversifying
the judiciary. 45 Whatever the motivations may have been, the calls went
unheeded. The tradition of a career judiciary became ever more deeply rooted
through the prewar period.
Shortly before World War II, the Japanese bar undertook a concerted
effort to promote appointment of judges from among experienced attorneys.
In 1937, the Japan Association of Attorneys established a Committee to
Effectuate the Hōsō Ichigen System.46 That committee prepared a resolution,
undertook outreach to the MOJ and other relevant parties, and drafted a bill.
The bill was introduced before the Imperial Diet in 1938, and would have
amended the Court Organization Act to require that all judges and prosecutors
FLAHERTY, supra note 38, at 264.
Id.; Higuchi Shunji (樋口俊二), Senjin ni Manabu Hōsō Ichigen no Gendaiteki Kadai (先人に学ぶ
法曹一元の現代的課題) [Learning from Our Predecessors about Contemporary Challenges for Hōsō
Ichigen], 39 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 2, at 32 (1988).
44
See, e.g., Hattori, supra note 22, at 139–40 n.116.
45
See, e.g., id. at 139–40. Along similar lines, legal advocates and attorneys in the 1890s also objected
to rules allowing former judges and prosecutors to receive licenses to practice law without undertaking any
examinations out of concern that the less competent judges and prosecutors would resign (or, presumably, be
nudged out of their positions in the downsizing that resulted from fiscal austerity measures) and then register
as attorneys, thereby lowering the level of the bar. FLAHERTY, supra note 38, at 263; see also ŌUCHI HYŌE &
WAGATSUMA SAKAE （大内兵衛＆我妻栄), NIHON NO SAIBAN SEIDO（日本の裁判制度）[THE JAPANESE
COURT SYSTEM] 26–27 (1965) (primary motivation for hōsō ichigen movement in the early 1920s was
“leveling” the legal profession by eliminating the gap between judges and prosecutors, on the one hand, and
attorneys on the other).
46
Kishii Tatsuo (岸井辰雄), Nihon Bengoshishi: Bengoshihō Sekō Ikō (日本弁護士史：弁護士法施
行已降) [History of Japanese Attorneys: Since the Attorneys Act Took Effect], in BENGOSHISHI (弁護士史)
[HISTORY OF ATTORNEYS] 39 (Tokyo Bengoshikai [Tokyo Bar Association] et al. ed., 1939).
42
43
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be appointed from among those with at least ten years of experience as
attorneys.47 The bill passed the House of Representatives. Yet when the Diet
session came to a close it was still pending in the House of Peers48 (where
prospects for passage were low49), and it never became law.50
Notably, the rationale offered by the Japanese bar at that time focused
explicitly on diversifying the judiciary. The resolution highlighted the
complexity of matters coming before the courts and the need not only for legal
knowledge, but for a deep understanding of society and human nature. To
expect such understanding from those who had entered the judiciary directly
upon completing legal education, without spending even a day as members of
society and with no other experience, is “akin to climbing a tree in search of
fish.”51 Thus, in the late 1930s, one finds a striking example of diagnosis or
conception of the concern over diversification, with a concrete reform
proposal that took a major step toward the initiation stage before stalling.
POSTWAR REFORMS

III.

The next major developments occurred during the postwar reform
process. The most important development to uniting the legal profession was
a fundamental change in the training system. As mentioned earlier, under the
prewar system there was a “rigid separation” between training for judges and
prosecutors, on the one hand, and attorneys, on the other.52 Following the
postwar reforms, judges, prosecutors, and attorneys took the same bar
examination. Those who passed undertook two additional years of training
together, through the Legal Training and Research Institute (LTRI) under the
auspices of the Supreme Court.53 This reform had profound implications for
Id. at 39–44.
KANEKO &TAKESHITA, supra note 22, at 231.
49
See ŌUCHI & W AGATSUMA, supra note 45, at 28–29.
50
The bill reportedly was reintroduced in each of the two subsequent sessions of the Diet, but suffered
the same fate each time, evidently meeting strong opposition by the MOJ. It has been reported, however, that
the Ministry appointed over 70 attorneys to posts in the judiciary and procuracy between 1938 and 1940,
perhaps in order to placate the bar association. Higuchi Shunji, supra note 43, at 32–33.
51
Resolution reproduced in Kishii, supra note 46, at 39–41.
52
Hakaru Abe, Education of the Legal Profession in Japan, in LEGAL ORDER, supra note 22, at 153–54.
53
E.g., Hattori, supra note 22, at 137–38. It was only near the end of that two-year period that
determinations were made as to which candidates would proceed on the judge track, prosecutor track, and
attorney track. For a detailed discussion of the postwar reforms to the legal training system by the
then-president of the LTRI, see Abe, supra note 52. In 1999, the training period was reduced to eighteen
months, and thereafter to just over one year; but, despite occasional suggestions that the program should be
limited to prospective judges, prosecutors, and courtroom litigators, the Japanese bar remains deeply
committed to unified training for all entrants to the legal profession. For detailed examinations of the Japanese
47
48
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the sense of identity among members of the three branches of the profession,
as well as those with attorney status.54
The postwar reforms also provided the bar with another opportunity to
push for hōsō ichigen in its more particularized sense. Most of the postwar
reforms to the Japanese legal and judicial systems took place under the
auspices of the Allied Occupation of Japan, which lasted from the end of the
war in 1945 through early 1952, led by General Douglas MacArthur,
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (“SCAP”). 55 Japanese
authorities embarked on some legal reforms even before the Occupation did
so. In meetings of the Justice System Revision Council, established under the
MOJ in late 1945, attorneys urged that all judges and prosecutors be drawn
from experienced lawyers. 56 They renewed the call in two other reform
councils the following year. 57 Although the Revision Council ended up
rejecting the proposal, it endorsed a statement expressing the desire that
preparations be made so hōsō ichigen could be achieved in the near future.58
At least one member of the Occupation publicly voiced his support for
hōsō ichigen.59 His views did not reflect the overall stance of the Occupation,
however.60 The Occupation was concerned (as were many Japanese judges
legal training system, including consideration of later reforms, see Rokumoto, Legal Education, in A
TURNING POINT, supra note 3, at 190, 213–14; Daniel H. Foote, The Trials and Tribulations of Japan’s Legal
Education Reforms, 36 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 369 (2013).
54
For a discussion of the impact on “the ideal of unification,” see Abe, supra note 52, at 167–70.
55
For overviews of the reforms to the legal and judicial systems under the Occupation, see, e.g., Alfred
C. Oppler, The Reform of Japan’s Legal and Judicial System under Allied Occupation, 24 WASH. L. REV. 290
(1949); ALFRED C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN: A PARTICIPANT LOOKS BACK (1976).
56
USHIOMI TOSHITAKA (潮見俊隆), SHIHŌ NO HŌSHAKAIGAKU (司法の法社会学) [SOCIOLOGY OF
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE] 176–78, 199–201 (1982). The Council was the Shihō Seido Kaisei
Shingikai (司法制度改正審議会). For an overview of the Council’s establishment and activities, together
with minutes of its deliberations, see 2 NAITŌ YORIHIRO (内藤頼博), SHŪSENGO NO SHIHŌ SEIDO KAIKAKU
NO KEIKA (ICHI JIMUTŌKYOKUSHA NO TACHIBA KARA) (終戦後の司法制度改革の経過 (一事務当局者の
立場から)) [THE COURSE OF POSTWAR REFORM TO THE JUSTICE SYSTEM (FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A
SINGLE MEMBER OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES)] 2–46 (1959). The original, appearing in two
volumes, was reprinted as NIHON RIPPŌ SHIRYŌ ZENSHŪ (日本立法資料全集), BEKKAN（別巻）91 & 92
[COMPLETE COLLECTION OF M ATERIALS ON JAPANESE LEGISLATION, SEPARATE VOLUMES 91 & 92] (1997).
57
See 2 NAITŌ YORIHIRO, supra note 56, at 71–72; USHIOMI, supra note 56, at 201.
58
2 NAITŌ YORIHIRO, supra note 56, at 46 (minutes of meeting held on December 18, 1945).
59
In March 1946, Captain Anthony Maniscalco, a member of the Public Safety Division of the Civil
Intelligence Section, sent the MOJ a “private draft” in his “personal capacity as one who might be involved in
the justice system reform process,” expressing support for a system in which judges and prosecutors would be
selected from law professors or attorneys with at least three years of experience. Japanese language summary
contained in id. at 54–55.
60
In February 1946, Alfred Oppler joined General MacArthur’s General Headquarters and became the
head of the unit (renamed the Courts and Law Division later that year) in charge of reforms to the judiciary.
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themselves) that the judiciary had been under the control of the MOJ and
insisted on establishing an independent judiciary. 61 Moreover, the Occupation
sought to position the newly established Supreme Court (which replaced the
Daishin’in as the highest court) outside the traditional career system. They
envisioned that the fifteen justices on the Supreme Court would come from a
broad range of backgrounds.62 For courts below the Supreme Court level,
though, the Occupation did not insist on a shift to the hōsō ichigen model.
Under the Constitution63 and the Courts Act of 194764 (which replaced the
prior Court Organization Act), the judges of the lower courts are appointed by
the Cabinet from a list of persons nominated by the Supreme Court. The
Occupation also sought to provide means for dealing with “incompetent or
otherwise objectionable judges.”65 They aimed to replace life tenure with a
system in which judges must be reappointed every ten years (again from a list
of persons nominated by the Supreme Court),66 until they reached a mandatory
retirement age (sixty-five for lower court judges).67 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court was given express authority to assign positions for lower court judges.68
This effectively confirmed the practice of rotating judges to new positions on a
regular basis. Finally, rather than providing for immediate appointment of
candidates as full judges following successful completion of the LTRI training
program, Article 42 of the Courts Act required at least ten years of experience
in one or more of several specified categories. In connection with the debate
over diversification of the judiciary, it is important to note that, from the time
that Act was enacted in 1947, those categories have included prosecutor,

Oppler himself had been an administrative law judge in Germany, which had a career judiciary; his chief
assistant, Thomas Blakemore, had studied law in Japan prior to the war and was familiar with the judicial
system. As a whole, they and the other Occupation authorities were comfortable with the career system. See,
e.g., Oppler, supra note 55, at 86–87, 91–93, 98–99, 305–13.
61
See, e.g., GOVERNMENT SECTION: SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, POLITICAL
REORIENTATION OF J APAN, SEPTEMBER 1945 TO SEPTEMBER 1948, at 200 (1948) [hereinafter SCAP].
62
See, e.g., Oppler, supra note 55, at 311. One goal for broadening this composition of the Supreme
Court was to raise the Court’s prestige. Even more importantly, the change reflected the intent that the
Supreme Court should serve a check on the other branches of government, and in doing so should approach
matters from a broader standpoint than had been the case previously. As envisioned, Supreme Court justices
ever since have come from various backgrounds (albeit with highly standardized appointment patterns),
always including at least one or two from outside the traditional legal profession. See Haley, supra note 22, at
105–12.
63
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] (憲法) [CONSTITUTION], art. 80 (Japan).
64
Saibanshohō (裁判所法) [Courts Act], Act No. 59 of 1947, art. 40.
65
SCAP, supra note 61, at 201.
66
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] (憲法) [CONSTITUTION], art. 80 (Japan).
67
Saibanshohō (裁判所法) [Courts Act], Act No. 59 of 1947, art. 50. For Supreme Court justices and
Summary Court judges, the retirement age is 70. Id.
68
Id. art. 57.
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attorney, and professor of law, as well as assistant judge.69 In turn, Article 43
provides that assistant judges are to be appointed from those who have
completed apprenticeship training. 70
To be sure, the Court Organization Act of 1890 also authorized
appointment of attorneys and law professors to the judiciary, but that authority
was rarely used. In sharp contrast, during the early postwar years, a substantial
number of attorneys were appointed as judges. That does not include the
lower-ranked Summary Court judges, many of whom came from the bar
during that period.71 In 1947 and 1948, before the first class completed the
newly established LTRI training program, the only newly hired judges came
from among attorneys. In 1949, seventy-two members from the first LTRI
class were hired as assistant judges. There were sixty more attorney
appointees that year. Attorneys continued to account for between 15% and
35% of judge appointees each year through 1954, and, with the exception of
two years in the mid-1950s, for over 10% through 1960. All told, during the
fourteen years from 1947 through 1960, attorneys constituted nearly 25% of
the lower court judges hired. Thus, one can point to the early postwar years
not only as an instance of diagnosis or conception, but as an instance of
initiation and even implementation of steps toward diversification.
That said, the change did not last. The level of attorney appointments
gradually declined through the 1950s and dropped off dramatically after 1962.
Thus, the incipient trend toward diversification of the judiciary withered by
the early 1960s. Japan’s career judiciary became firmly re-entrenched. The
overwhelming majority of judges entered as assistant judges immediately after
completing LTRI training and proceeded through reappointments every ten
years (and regular transfers to new positions, typically every three years) up
until retirement.72
Id. art. 42(1).
Id. art. 43.
71
With the exception of data for the even-numbered years between 1948 and 1954, the figures
contained in this and the following paragraph are calculated from a table in KANEKO & TAKESHITA, supra note
22, at 234. The data for the missing years is contained in the same table in the prior edition of that book,
KANEKO HAJIME & TAKESHITA MORIO,（金子一＆竹下守夫）, SAIBANHŌ（裁判法) [COURTS LAW] (3rd ed.
1994).
72
As noted above, the mandatory retirement age for lower court judges is sixty-five. Although the
exact numbers are not publicized, a fair number of judges retire early, most of whom become attorneys. See,
e.g., Igaki Yasuhiro (井垣康弘), Watakushi no Kōsō Suru “Hōsō Ichigen Seido” (私の構想する「法曹一元」
制度) [The “Hōsō Ichigen” System as I Conceive It], 51 JIYŪ TO SEIGI no. 1, at 76 (2000) (of approximately
sixty assistant judges who entered the judiciary together in 1967, only about half were still on the bench in
2000; of the remainder, the great majority became attorneys or notaries); Watanabe Chihara (渡辺千原),
69
70

18

IV.

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 27 NO. 1

THE PROVISIONAL JUSTICE SYSTEM INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE: THE
ROAD TO AND THE AFTERMATH

Proponents of hōsō ichigen did not give up. The next major proposal
emanated from the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (“JFBA”), the
governing body for the nationwide bar. In March 1954, the JFBA executive
board approved an “Outline for Hōsō Ichigen.”73 A few years later, JFBA
received an important ally, the Japan Bar Association (“JBA,” Nihon
Hōritsuka Kyōkai, 日本法律家協会), a prestigious voluntary organization
that includes judges, prosecutors, and legal academics, as well as practicing
lawyers. In June 1961, the JBA board of governors approved its own
“Concrete Outline for Realization of Hōsō Ichigen.”74
The two proposals shared the view that the assistant judge system
should be discontinued and judges should be drawn from persons with
experience outside the judiciary. However, they differed considerably on the
specifics. Under the JFBA outline, all judges and prosecutors would be
appointed from among experienced attorneys. JFBA, as the governing body
for the bar, would have authority to prepare the list of candidates for the
judiciary.75 In addition to highlighting the value of the real-world experience
from attorneys, the JFBA proposal stressed the goal of democratizing the
judiciary and procuracy. By replacing career judges and prosecutors with
attorneys, the reform would break the cycle of dominance by bureaucratic
elites.76 In contrast, under the JBA outline, judges would be drawn from those
with rich experience as attorneys, prosecutors, or in other types of related legal
work. 77 Thus, the JBA viewed the shift away from the traditional career
system primarily in terms of diversifying the judiciary.78
Bengoshi e no Tenshoku: Zenshoku Keiken no aru Bengoshi no Gyōmu Tokusei to Bengoshikan (弁護士への
転職：前職経験のある弁護士の業務特性と弁護士観) [Occupation Change to Lawyer: Special Work
Characteristics and Views on Lawyers by Lawyers with Prior Employment Experience], in HENDŌKI NO
NIHON NO BENGOSHI (変動期の日本の弁護士) [J APANESE LAWYERS IN A TIME OF CHANGE] 160, 172–75
(Satō Iwao (佐藤岩夫) & Hamano Ryō (濱野亮) eds., 2015).
73
KANEKO & TAKESHITA, supra note 22, at 231.
74
Id.
75
Id. Furthermore, since all members of the legal profession would begin their legal careers as
practicing lawyers, the JFBA would also take charge of the LTRI training program. Id.
76
ŌUCHI & W AGATSUMA, supra note 45, at 32–33.
77
Id. at 32–33; KANEKO & TAKESHITA, supra note 22, at 231. The JBA envisioned that in the future
those who passed the bar exam and completed LTRI training increasingly would enter legal work in
government agencies or other bodies, ŌUCHI & W AGATSUMA, supra note 45, at 33.
78
The JBA also envisioned the establishment of a new body to screen candidates for the judiciary and
supervise legal training. In its conception, that body, as with the JBA itself, would include representatives
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Despite their differences, the two outlines agreed on the importance of
diversifying the judiciary. So when the Diet passed a bill in May 1962
establishing the Provisional Justice System Investigation Committee
(“Investigation Committee” or “Committee”), proponents of hōsō ichigen
might well have thought their long cherished goal was nearing realization.79
The Committee operated under the Cabinet. It consisted of twenty members,
including three judges, three prosecutors, and three attorneys, and was chaired
by University of Tokyo Professor Emeritus Wagatsuma Sakae. 80 A major
impetus for the Committee was the difficulty of attracting sufficient new
judges. As a result, existing judges were overburdened, leading to delays in
processing cases. 81 The enabling legislation called on the Committee to
investigate “fundamental and comprehensive measures urgently needed . . . so
as to ensure proper operation of the justice system,” with a particular focus on
the following two items: 1) “matters related to the hōsō ichigen system”
(which the legislation further defined as “the system under which, in principle,
judges are appointed from among those who possess qualification as lawyers
and have engaged in legally related work other than as judges”), and 2) “other
items related to the appointment system and salary system for judges and
prosecutors.” 82 Although the Investigation Committee completed its
deliberations over fifty years ago, the experiences of that period hold deep
relevance for recent debates and developments. Accordingly, it is helpful to
review the Committee’s deliberations and recommendations together with the
response to those recommendations.
The Committee devoted a considerable portion of its deliberations, and
nearly fifty pages of its final report, to the hōsō ichigen issue. The report
discussed the importance of diversifying the judiciary, and criticized the
bureaucratic nature and other weaknesses of the traditional career system.83
Yet the tone of the deliberations and the final conclusions were far from the
hopes and expectations of hōsō ichigen proponents. Based in part on prior

from all three branches of the legal profession. KANEKO & TAKESHITA, supra note 22, at 231.
79
Rinji Shihō Seido Chōsakai Setchihō (臨時司法制度調査会設置法) [Provisional Justice System
Investigation Committee Establishment Act], Act No. 122 of 1962 [hereinafter Establishment Act].
80
The other members were seven Diet members, two businesspeople, and one additional legal scholar.
81
Rinji Shihō Seido Chōsakai Ikensho （臨時司法制度調査会意見書） [Report of the Provisional
Justice System Investigation Committee], 16 HŌSŌ JIHŌ, no. 8, at 1 (1964) [hereinafter Investigation
Committee Report] (reprinted as a special supplement).
82
Establishment Act, art. 2.
83
Investigation Committee Report, supra note 81, at 19–21, 32–37.
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experience and survey results,84 the Committee raised numerous doubts about
the feasibility of attracting sufficient attorneys to enter the judiciary. The
Committee noted various practical barriers: burdens associated with the
regular transfers (which are especially hard on those with families);
responsibilities to existing clients; judges’ heavy workloads; loss of income
due to the disparity in pay levels between attorneys and judges; loss in
retirement allowances and pension benefits from switching employment; and
the complexities of judicial duties.85
The Committee also identified a long list of conditions that would need
to be met in order to achieve successful implementation of hōsō ichigen.86
The first essential precondition, in the view of the Committee, was a “dramatic
increase” in the size of the legal profession.87 Other requirements for success
included alleviating the great disparity in the level of attorneys in urban and
rural regions, raising public trust in attorneys, and strengthening attorneys’
sense of public service, as well as improving working conditions, pay and
other benefits for judges. 88 Quite apart from the practical barriers and
preconditions, several Committee members expressed doubts about attorneys’
qualifications, and they raised concerns about dangers associated with
appointing lawyers to the bench, including “the tendency to overly
individualistic attitudes” among attorneys.89 They also expressed praise for
the merits of the existing career system, including its strengths in ensuring
fairness, integrity, and legal stability. 90
As its conclusion, the Investigation Committee stated:

84
Notwithstanding the number of attorneys who entered the judiciary in the early postwar years, see
supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text, by 1964, former attorneys constituted only 14% of the judiciary. In
a survey conducted by the Supreme Court in 1961, only four out of 142 attorneys with 10–12 years of
experience surveyed expressed an interest in joining the judiciary. Investigation Committee Report, supra note
81at 52–53.
85
Id. at 53.
86
Id. at 38–41.
87
Id. at 38. The report used the phrase hiyakuteki zōka (飛躍的増加).
88
Id. at 38–41.
89
Id. at 36.
90
See, e.g., id. at 33–38. Moreover, it bears note that the concerns and criticisms listed in the official
report evidently were toned down considerably. Ōno Masao, Hōsō Ichigen no Rinen to Bengoshi no Sekinin
(法曹一元の理念と弁護士の責任) [The Principle of Hōsō Ichigen and the Responsibility of Attorneys], 15
JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 12, at 6 (1964).
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The hōsō ichigen system (as defined in the [Establishment Act]),
if it is achieved smoothly, would be one91 desirable system for
Japan.
However, the various conditions that would serve as the base for
achieving this system are not yet in place.
Accordingly, at the present time, improvements in the existing
system should be undertaken while bearing in mind the strengths
of the hōsō ichigen system, and at the same time sufficient
consideration should be given to preparing the base referred to
above.92
The first concrete recommendation for action called on the three
branches of the profession “to cooperate so that as many suitable attorneys,
prosecutors, etc., as possible may be appointed as judges.” 93 Yet as
Wagatsuma, who chaired the Committee, noted the following year, the bar and
many other observers regarded the final report as representing the “funeral”
for hōsō ichigen.94 Members of the bar, he added, were angry to see this
funeral, whereas many judges and prosecutors were “relieved.”95
As to his own vision, Wagatsuma offered the following:
Personally, I would like to see the number of candidates accepted
to the LTRI roughly doubled, resulting in about 1000 new
entrants to the legal profession each year. If those new entrants
could not all be absorbed as judges, prosecutors, and attorneys,
they should enter posts handling legal matters as government
officials or join legal departments in banks and companies. And
those who had attained experience in these varied occupations
would then become judges. I anticipated that this sort of
approach to preparing the base would arise naturally from our
deliberations.96
The word “one” (一つ) in the recommendation carries the distinct connotation that it is not the only
desirable system.
92
Investigation Committee Report, supra note 81, at 185 (emphasis added).
93
Id.
94
ŌUCHI & W AGATSUMA, supra note 45, at 178.
95
Id. at 178–79, 181.
96
Id. at 179–80. Wagatsuma stressed that he did not mean to imply that the assistant judge system
would be abolished. Rather, he felt it would be desirable if the career system accounted for about half of all
91
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To place this comment in context, after ranging between 224 and 346
during the period from 1949 through 1960, the number of bar exam passers
rose to 496 in 1963, 508 in 1964, and 554 in 1966. That proved to be the
highest point for the next quarter century. From 1967 through 1990, the
number of passers hovered at about 500 per year, with a high of 537 and a low
of just 446. It was not until 1999, thirty-four years after Wagatsuma’s
statement, that the number of passers reached 1000.97 Also, until 2000, the
Attorneys Act prohibited attorneys from entering full-time employment in
governmental entities. 98 Lastly, until 2003, the Attorneys Act required
attorneys to obtain authorization from their local bar association before
entering employment in banks or companies.99 As of the mid-1960s, it was
virtually unheard of for lawyers to work in companies; and it is only over the
past decade that the number of in-house lawyers has begun to rise
substantially.100 In sum, Wagatsuma was well ahead of his time—or, to put it
differently, Japan was very slow to recognize the wisdom of his vision.
Wagatsuma was critical of the judges and prosecutors who were
relieved to see the “funeral” for hōsō ichigen, stating, “the harms of the career
system are far more serious than they realize.”101 He expressed much greater
frustration, however, with the attitude of the bar. In his words, “[w]hen
matters relating to reform of the justice system come up, no matter how small
the issue, members of the bar say that if hōsō ichigen is adopted, those
problems will all be solved immediately, but if it isn’t adopted things won’t
improve.”102 “They offer their assurances that, once they put their minds to it
and undertake preparations, there will be enough attorneys who desire to enter
the judiciary, but they don’t offer any particular concrete measures to be
judges, with the remaining half coming from a broad range of backgrounds outside the judiciary. Id. at 181.
97
See, e.g., Rokumoto, supra note 53, at 213–14.
98
Bengoshihō (弁護士法) [Attorneys Act], Act No. 205 of 1949, art. 30, sec. 1 (prior to revision
pursuant to Act No. 128 of 2003). The general prohibition was not abolished until 2003. In 2000, however, an
exception was added for fixed-term positions in national government agencies. That exception was
accompanied by the passage of a separate act authorizing such appointments. Ippanshoku no ninkitsuki
shokuin no saiyō oyobi kyūyo no tokurei ni kansuru hōritsu (一般職の任期付職員の採用及び給与の特例
に関する法律) [Act regarding Special Exceptions for the Hiring and Salaries of Regular (Public) Employees
on a Fixed Term Basis], Act No. 125 of 2000.
99
Id. art. 30, sec. 3 (prior to revision pursuant to Act No. 128 of 2003).
100
See, e.g., Nihon Soshikinai Bengoshi Kyōkai (日本組織内弁護士協会) [Japan In-House Lawyers
Association], Kigyōnai Bengoshisū no Suii (企業内弁護士数の推移) [Trends in the Numbers of Lawyers
Working in Corporations] (2017), http://jila.jp/pdf/transition.pdf.
101
ŌUCHI & W AGATSUMA, supra note 45, at 180–81.
102
Id. at 178.
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taken.”103 In explaining why the Investigation Committee did not set out more
clearly what sorts of changes to the existing system were needed, Wagatsuma
said: “That’s because we could not reach consensus on those matters. What
astonished me most of all is that even on the topic of increasing the size of the
legal profession, the attorneys on the Committee couldn’t agree among
themselves.”104
As it turned out, by raising pay levels and undertaking improvements to
working conditions, 105 the judiciary regained the ability to recruit sufficient
new assistant judges. As alluded to earlier, the Committee also called for the
establishment of a “Justice Council,” including representatives of each of the
three branches of the profession and other persons of learning and experience,
to consult on issues of importance, “such as cooperation on matters relating
to . . . the size of the legal profession [and] interchanges within the
profession.”106 JFBA refused to participate in the proposed Council, feeling
that the Committee’s treatment of hōsō ichigen and other matters represented a
betrayal.107 When coupled with the prevailing attitude, explicitly endorsed by
a 1970 Diet resolution, that “matters related to justice system reform should be
achieved based on consensus by the three branches of the legal profession,” 108
this refusal to participate left many matters (including, notably, the
Committee’s recommendation for a major increase in the size of the legal
profession) effectively in limbo. Moreover, whatever Wagatsuma may have
felt personally, the Committee report seemed to signal the burying of hōsō
ichigen for many years to come.
In sum, the period leading up to the establishment of the Investigation
Committee, together with the Committee deliberations, almost certainly
represents the most extended and detailed diagnosis of the issue of
diversification of the judiciary ever undertaken in Japan. Yet rather than
leading to initiation and implementation of reform measures, those
deliberations and their aftermath further entrenched the career judiciary. The
number of attorneys appointed to the judiciary had already begun to decline by
Id. at 181.
Id. at 179.
105
Investigation Committee Report, supra note 81, at 191–94.
106
Id. at 191.
107
KANEKO & TAKESHITA, supra note 22, at 232; KOBAYASHI MASAHIRO (小 林 正 啓), KONNA
NICHIBENREN NI DARE GA SHITA? (こんな日弁連に誰がした？) [WHO TURNED JFBA INTO THIS?] 160, 230
(2010).
108
Resolution of the Committee on Legal Affairs of the Upper House, quoted in KOBAYASHI, supra note
107, at 118.
103
104
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the early 1960s. Thereafter, such appointments virtually dried up. During the
twenty-four-year period from 1964 through 1987, attorneys accounted for
only forty-two of the 1681 judges and assistant judges appointed—under 2.5%
of the total.109
RECRUITMENT OF ATTORNEYS
1980S AND 1990S

V.

FOR

JUDICIAL POSITIONS

IN THE

LATE

Nearly a quarter of a century passed before the next major development,
one that went beyond diagnosis to initiation and took concrete steps for
implementation. This time, the impetus came not from the bar but from the
judiciary. In March 1988, the Supreme Court issued a document entitled The
Main Points for Hiring and Selection of Judges. In it, the judiciary announced
the plan to hire approximately twenty judges annually from among attorneys
under the age of fifty-five with at least fifteen years of practice experience. As
the reason for this new policy, the Supreme Court highlighted the desire to hire
judges with broad experience, able to handle complex and diverse cases
arising from advances in society. 110
Chief Justice Yaguchi Kōichi (矢口洪一) was responsible for initiating
this policy.111 Yaguchi was deeply familiar with the hōsō ichigen issue, having
served on the support staff for the Investigation Committee. In a set of
memoirs, published in 1993, 112 Yaguchi rejected the view, sometimes
espoused by attorneys, that, “due to the career system, judges inevitably are
ignorant of the ways of the world whereas attorneys are never lacking in that
regard.”113 At the same time, he voiced support for diversifying the judiciary,
stating, “From my many years of experience I feel there is no need to be
wedded to the career system . . . . In today’s complicated society, I don’t think
it’s necessarily desirable to insist on only one pure system.”114 He went on to
say, “I believe it’s good for judges from various backgrounds to work together,
improving their abilities . . . by sharing their experiences and viewpoints.”115

KANEKO & TAKESHITA, supra note 22, at 232.
Id. at 233 (summary of Hanji Saiyō Senkō Yōryō (判事採用選考要領) from the Japanese Supreme
Court (1988)).
111
See, e.g., YAGUCHI KŌICHI (矢口洪一), SAIKŌSAIBANSHO TO TOMO NI (最高裁判所とともに)
[TOGETHER WITH THE SUPREME COURT] 43 (1993).
112
Id.
113
Id. at 44.
114
Id. at 43.
115
Id. at 44.
109
110
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In a later chapter of his memoirs (focused primarily on a program,
which Yaguchi also initiated, of sending young judges to the United States and
Europe to study the jury system and other forms of lay participation), Yaguchi
returned to the career system:
Having been a witness to judicial administration in the postwar
era, I recognize the many strengths of Japan’s career judicial
system, but I’ve also felt a number of doubts. Given that it’s a
career system, regular training is essential for assistant
judges . . . , but if the training from start to finish is confined to
internal training within the judiciary, there’s a tendency to
become detached from the feelings of the general public. That’s
why I’ve placed efforts into training outside the judiciary and to
overseas experience.
How about boldly adopting hōsō ichigen? . . . Under current
circumstances, even if we were to appoint judges from among
attorneys, we would be limited to an extremely low number. In
that case, is there some system by which we could maintain the
strengths of the career system while directly reflecting the views
of the public in trials?
[It was with that thought in mind] that we undertook investigation
and research [into the jury and lay participation systems], to
consider whether they would be appropriate for Japan.116
As these quotes reflect, Yaguchi viewed both diversification of the judiciary
and the lay participation system as means to expose career judges to external
influences and thereby broaden their perspectives.
Yaguchi’s reference to “plac[ing] efforts into training outside the
judiciary and to overseas experience” bears especial note. Reflecting back on
his career, Yaguchi commented, “With the exception of a handful of judges
who undertook study abroad, within the judiciary there was no thought at all of
trying to learn anything from society, other than from the legal academy.”117
As of the early 1970s, at most two or three judges each year went to the United
States for study. As soon as he became head of the Personnel Bureau in the
Supreme Court General Secretariat in 1970, Yaguchi proposed that half of
116
117

Id. at 114.
Id. at 88.
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each class of judges should attain experience abroad. He reports that the
proposal initially was met with the traditional attitude that study abroad was a
reward, akin to a “medal for meritorious service.” He kept at it though, and in
1972 the judiciary initiated a special program to send assistant judges abroad
to study in the United States, England, Germany and France. 118 The
University of Washington School of Law was one of the earliest schools to
participate in that program, and has received an assistant judge from Japan as a
visiting scholar every year since 1977.119 By the time Yaguchi penned his
memoirs in 1993, he reported that the judiciary was sending between ten and
twenty assistant judges abroad for study each year, and that overall, including
short term fact-finding missions, well over fifty judges were going abroad
every year.120
In addition to the study abroad program, in the early 1980s, when he
was Secretary General at the Supreme Court General Secretariat, Yaguchi took
the lead in establishing a program to have about ten senior assistant judges,
typically those in their tenth and final year as assistant judges, spend three to
four weeks working in major newspapers. 121 As Yaguchi explained, the
genesis for that idea was that “correctness” and “promptness” are both
important values for judges. However, those values sometimes are regarded as
being in conflict. He felt that, by experiencing work at newspapers, which
demand accuracy but constantly face strict deadlines, judges would develop a
better appreciation for how to achieve both values at the same time. 122
Thereafter, the program for having judges undertake training outside the
judiciary expanded to companies (with both short and long term programs),
government ministries and agencies (two-year terms), embassies and
consulates outside Japan (also two years), and other types of postings. 123 As
Yaguchi reflected on the establishment of this program, he stated:
For companies and government ministries and agencies, setting
up these sorts of external training programs may not be so
difficult, but it took a great deal of resolve and a change in
thinking for the judiciary to tackle this matter. Within the
Id. at 90.
See John O. Haley, Asian Law Center: The First Half Century, the First Decades: 1961–2000, in
LEGAL INNOVATIONS IN ASIA: J UDICIAL LAWMAKING AND THE INFLUENCE OF COMPARATIVE LAW 7, 13 (John
O. Haley & Toshiko Takenaka eds., 2014).
120
YAGUCHI, supra note 111, at 90.
121
See id. at 88–89.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 89.
118
119
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judiciary, the illusion was widely shared that having no contact
with the outside world was proof of judicial independence. For
that reason, at the start I anticipated there would be considerable
resistance from the places we approached as settings for the
external training experiences. The fact we were able to achieve
this program without meeting such resistance may reflect a
changing in the mood of the times.124
Yaguchi added, “The fact that a single system could continue for forty
years, with no influence from changes in the societal environment, is in itself
quite remarkable. Moreover, it was only in the postwar era that the judiciary
had come to be completely inbred.”125 He noted that, as a consequence of the
establishment of the programs for overseas study and training outside the
judiciary, some judges had become attached to the vigorous nature of those
activities and had decided to give up their judicial careers and become
attorneys.126 While he was sad to see this happen, he viewed it as part of the
learning process in developing a new model for judges suited to the changing
times.127
Yaguchi earned the nickname “Mr. Judicial Administration.” 128 He
spent nearly two-thirds of his forty-two year judicial career in administrative
posts, including serving as head of the Supreme Court’s General Secretariat
and as head of the Civil, Administrative, and Personnel Bureaus within the
General Secretariat. Some critics appear to regard all his actions skeptically,
suspecting ulterior motives aimed solely at advancing the interests of the
judiciary. In that vein, the lead article in a special issue on bengoshi ninkan
(the appointment of attorneys to the judiciary) of Jiyū to Seigi, the flagship
journal of the JFBA, published in 1993, characterized the 1988 initiative
seeking to recruit attorneys to the judiciary, “undertaken unilaterally from on
high, completely ignoring the bar association,” as an “effort to kill two birds
with one stone, by filling vacancies in the understaffed judiciary while
deflecting public criticism of judge/prosecutor exchanges.”129
Id.
Id.
126
Id. at 90.
127
Id.
128
See, e.g., id. at 82.
129
Shimomura Sachio (下村幸雄), Bengoshi Ninkan no Konnichiteki Igi (弁護士任官の今日的意義)
[The Current Significance of Appointing Attorneys to the Judiciary], 44 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 4, at 5, 6 (1993).
The reference to “judge/prosecutor exchanges” refers to a practice, dating from the early postwar years, in
which a number of judges each year were seconded to the Ministry of Justice, where they served as
124
125
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Yaguchi’s reputation as “Mr. Judicial Administration” may very well
have allowed him to push for initiatives from which others would have shied
away from. Whether or not he himself favored introducing the jury system to
Japan, a strong case can be made that his willingness to place the imprimatur
of the Chief Justice on a serious investigation of the topic opened the door to
introduction of the lay judge system nearly twenty years later. In any event,
the impact of his initiative on appointing attorneys to the judiciary was
immediate. During the six-year period prior to 1988, there had been zero
appointments of attorneys to the judiciary.130 Had the Supreme Court sought
agreement with JFBA before undertaking the initiative, it likely would have
led to protracted deliberations. By “unilaterally” announcing the new policy,
the judiciary was able to jump-start the process. Although the judiciary did not
reach its stated target of twenty new appointments per year, in 1988 five
attorneys were appointed as judges, followed by four more appointments (two
judges and two assistant judges) the following year.131
The initiative also served as the spur to action for the bar. After the
initiative was announced, the bar undertook behind the scenes discussions
with the Supreme Court and the MOJ.132 Then, following his election as
President of JFBA in 1990, Nakabō Kōhei declared justice reform as a major
theme of his two-year term.133 As part of its efforts, JFBA undertook a survey
of its members regarding the Supreme Court’s initiative and related matters.134
While over 18% of the nearly 2500 respondents regarded the initiative as
“nothing more than a stopgap measure to meet the need for more judges,”
nearly 80% viewed it as a step in the right direction, albeit more than half
expressed the need for further revisions to the standards and procedures.135
Based in part on those results, JFBA undertook formal negotiations with the
prosecutors before returning to the judiciary, and a number of prosecutors were seconded to the judiciary,
where they served as judges before returning to MOJ. This practice is discussed more fully at infra, note 258.
For a more charitable assessment of Yaguchi’s role, see KOBAYASHI, supra note 107, at 68–69 (view that,
throughout his career, Yaguchi sought to preserve the independence of the judiciary and raise the judiciary’s
status).
130
KANEKO & TAKESHITA, supra note 22, at 233.
131
Id.
132
Shimomura, supra note 129, at 6.
133
See, e.g., Intabyū: Bengoshi Ninkan Seido ni tsuite (インタビュー：弁護士任官制度について)
[Interview: Regarding the System for Appointment of Attorneys as Judges], 44 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 4, at 42, 44
(1993) [hereinafter Interview] (comment by Suganuma Takashi).
134
Ōkawa Shinrō (大川真郎), Bengoshi Ninkan Suishin no Torikumi Keika (弁護士任官推進の取組み
経過) [The Progress of Efforts to Promote Bengoshi Ninkan], 44 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 4, at 20 (1993).
135
Id. at 20.
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Supreme Court and the MOJ, which in turn led to a three-party agreement in
1992, as well as separate documents setting out the “main points for hiring of
attorneys” as judges and as prosecutors.136
For judges, in line with requests from JFBA, the criteria of those eligible
for appointment was expanded from those with fifteen or more years of
experience to those with at least five years. Additionally, new candidates’
location preferences would be taken into account, and attorneys with at least
fifteen years of experience would be posted in or near the place of their
residence if they so desired. 137 In the early 1990s, JFBA also raised the
possibility of establishing a part-time judge system, based in part on an
English model, in which attorneys would serve as judges for a fixed number of
days each year (twenty to fifty, perhaps).138 About half the attorneys surveyed
in Osaka and Tokyo expressed interest in serving as part-time judges. 139
However, given the wide range of logistical factors that would need to be
addressed and the difficulty of incorporating a part-time system into the
traditional career judiciary, that system was not introduced.140
JFBA devoted great effort to promoting the appointment system. So by
the early 1990s the system clearly had entered the implementation stage—the
stage for “translating abstract goals into practical policies.”141 Initially, those
efforts appeared to have an impact. In 1992, a total of eight attorneys joined
the judiciary (four judges and four assistant judges); the following year, eight
more joined, all as judges.142 In a joint interview in early 1993, Nakabō and
Suganuma Takashi, who served as vice chair of JFBA headquarters for
promoting justice reform, acknowledged the numbers were not as high as they
These are reproduced as Materials 2 and 3 in Shiryō: Bengoshi Ninkan (資料：弁護士任官)
[Materials: Bengoshi Ninkan], 44 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 4, at 91, 100, 101 (1993).
137
Id., Material 2, at 100. In addition, a stipulation was included that those appointed should be willing
to spend at least five years in the judiciary, thus explicitly leaving the door open for appointees to return to law
practice thereafter. Id.
138
See Aoki Masayoshi (青木正芳), Hijōkin Saibankan Seido no Ichizuke (非常勤裁判官制度の位置
づけ) [The Position of the Part-Time Judge System], 44 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 4, at 35.
139
Id. at 41.
140
Interview, supra note 133, at 51 (comment of Suganuma).
141
FEELEY, supra note 7, at 37. Among those efforts, the JFBA requested the thirteen local bar
associations with at least 200 members to establish special bodies to promote bengoshi ninkan. By 1993, ten
of those local associations had complied. See Interview, supra note 133, at 44 (comment of Suganuma). The
JFBA also continued to promote bengoshi ninkan with special issues and feature stories in Jiyū to Seigi. See,
e.g., Tokushū: Bengoshi Ninkan (特集：弁護士任官) [Special Topic: Bengoshi Ninkan], 44 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no.
4, at 26–34 (articles on the efforts by No. 1 Tokyo Bar Association, Osaka Bar Association, and Nagoya Bar
Association), 61–90 (panel discussion).
142
KANEKO & TAKESHITA, supra note 22, at 234–35.
136
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might have wished. 143 They identified many challenges facing efforts to
increase those numbers. With respect to the attitude of the judiciary, Nakabō
said he felt those he had dealt with, at least at the Supreme Court level, were
actively seeking to promote hiring of attorneys, and not simply espousing their
support as a smokescreen to hide the real aim of remedying a shortage of
judges.144 He cautioned, however, that he was not so sure rank-and-file judges
shared those views. He had heard some lower court judges question whether
appointing attorneys was a good thing, and he witnessed considerable
resentment among attorneys that experienced lawyers were being given
preferable treatment with regard to the location of their postings.145
Nakabō and Suganuma also identified numerous challenges on the
lawyer side, including: attachment to practice and doubts about whether
becoming a judge is truly an appealing option, difficulty in making
arrangements for clients and staff, and concerns about the appointment
process.146 Nakabō had been hopeful attorneys from the larger firms would
apply to enter the judiciary. It would be much easier for them to arrange for
others to take over their clients than for sole practitioners or those in small
firms.147 Additionally, in the event they chose to return to practice, it would be
easier to do so. But after the first two years of the new system, by which point
sixteen attorneys already had entered the judiciary, not one attorney from any
of the large firms had applied. The attitude at those firms, as Nakabō saw it,
was that they were extremely busy and successful, and they couldn’t bear to let
go of those who were responsible for “laying the golden egg.”148 Nakabō’s
comment was based on a meeting he had with leaders of large firms in the
Osaka area, who said they had too much work and too few associates to meet
the demand. Presumably, senior associates and junior partners at those firms
also would have been reluctant to leave their successful practices, due to a
sense of obligation to their clients and their firm. The challenges mentioned
above closely parallel concerns raised in the Investigation Committee’s
deliberations nearly thirty years earlier. In modest signs of hope, however,
based on the initial two years under the new system, it did not appear that
salary disparity, 149 concerns over pension or retirement benefits, 150 nor
concerns over the location of postings or transfers were major barriers.151
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

Interview, supra note 133, at 48.
Id. at 45–46.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 46–49.
Id. at 49–50.
Id. at 50.
Interview, supra note 133, at 49.
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Despite the challenges, Nakabō and Suganuma expressed hope more
attorneys would choose to enter the judiciary in future years. Suganuma
likened the initial efforts to dew falling from leaves, which in time might
collect into a small stream and then grow to a large river. 152 From that
perspective, the results of the third year might have provided a bit of hope. In
1994 nine attorneys joined the judiciary.153 While only one more than in each
of the prior two years, the trend was upward. The momentum, however, did
not continue. In 1995 only three attorneys made the move, followed by six and
seven, respectively, the next two years, and dropping to just three again in
1998.154
In sum, the Supreme Court’s 1988 initiative, followed by the joint
efforts of JFBA and the Supreme Court, represent yet another instance of
diagnosis or conception, together with the second full-fledged instance of
initiation and implementation of efforts to diversify the judiciary. One might
even view this period as having reached the routinization stage, since the
framework for recruiting attorneys to the judiciary continued in operation
through the 1990s. In any event, before the flow could even coalesce into a
small stream, it turned back into a mere trickle.
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL AND RECENT REFORMS

VI.

A.

Overview of the JSRC and the Reform Proposals

We at last come to the most recent set of reforms. The direct impetus
came from a government advisory council, the JSRC, which undertook its
deliberations in 1999. As with the Investigation Committee of the early 1960s,
the JSRC was established by an act of the Diet. 155 In a significant shift,
whereas nine of the Investigation Committee’s twenty members came from
the legal profession, only three of the thirteen JSRC members came from the
Id. at 50 (the interviewer, Sakaguchi Shigekazu (坂口繁和), noted pension benefits for judges were
typically higher than for attorneys, and attorneys did not receive retirement allowances).
151
Id. at 49.
152
Id. at 52.
153
KANEKO & TAKESHITA, supra note 22, at 234.
154
Id. Figures compiled by the JFBA are even lower. See White Paper, JFBA, Bengoshi Hakusho 2016
nenban (弁護士白書 2016 年版) [White Paper on Attorneys, 2016 Edition] 142 (2016) [hereinafter White
Paper].
155
Shihō Seido Kaikaku Shingikai Setchihō (司法制度改革審議会設置法) [Justice System Reform
Council Establishment Act], Act No. 68 of 1999 [hereinafter JSRC Establishment Act].
150
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legal profession, one from each of the “three branches.”156 This relatively
limited representation reflected the view that decisions over the size of the bar
and other matters related to the justice system were so important they could no
longer be left to the legal profession.
Although the JSRC Establishment Act did not specifically refer to hōsō
ichigen or the judicial appointment system,157 those topics clearly were within
the Council’s broad mandate. 158 The bar viewed the deliberations as an
opportunity to renew the push for hōsō ichigen. Indeed, in the run-up to
establishment of the JSRC, JFBA had again begun to campaign for hōsō
ichigen. That campaign reportedly was triggered by then-former Chief Justice
Yaguchi’s statement in a major newspaper in late December 1996, that “to
achieve the people’s trust, the [hōsō] ichigen system is the most desirable
system.”159 JFBA members again took up the call, undertaking a wide range
of activities, including a major symposium in November 1998, which in turn
resulted in a 450-page book on hōsō ichigen. 160 Those involved in the
campaign also undertook outreach activities to the mass media and
politicians.161

See JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, Appendix (list of members) (the other members were
three legal academics, two non-law academics, two business leaders, a labor union leader, a consumer
organization leader, and a novelist).
157
While not expressly included in the JSRC Establishment Act, resolutions attached to that Act in both
the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors did include explicit references to hōsō ichigen. See
(SHŪGIIN HŌMU IINKAI) SHIHŌ SEIDO KAIKAKU SHINGIKAI SETCHIHŌAN NI TAISURU FUTAI KETSUGI ((衆議院
法 務 委 員 会) 司 法 制 度 改 革 審 議 会 設 置 法 案 に 対 す る 附 帯 決 議) [(HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL AFFAIRS) SUPPLEMENTARY RESOLUTION REGARDING THE BILL FOR THE JSRC
ESTABLISHMENT ACT] (1999), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/990803syugiin.html; see also (SANGIIN
HŌMU IINKAI) SHIHŌ SEIDO KAIKAKU SHINGIKAI SETCHIHŌAN NI TAISURU FUTAI KETSUGI
((参議院法務委員会)司法制度改革審議会設置法案に対する附帯決議) [(HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS
COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL AFFAIRS) SUPPLEMENTARY RESOLUTION REGARDING THE BILL FOR THE JSRC
ESTABLISHMENT ACT] (1999), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/990803sangiin.html.
158
JSRC Establishment Act, art. 2 (the JSRC was established for the following purposes: “to clarify the
role to be played by justice in Japanese society in the 21st century; and to examine and deliberate fundamental
measures necessary for the realization of a justice system that is easy for the people to utilize, measures
necessary for participation by the people in the justice system, measures necessary for . . . strengthening the
functions of the legal profession, and other reforms of the justice system, as well as improvements in the
infrastructure of that system”).
159
KOBAYASHI, supra note 107, at 161; see also Yaguchi Kōichi (谷口洪一), “Hōso Ichigen” no Seido
to Kokoro （「法曹一元」の制度と心) [The System and Spirit of “Hōsō Ichigen”], 49 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 7, at
14 (1998) (Yaguchi’s comment appeared in the Mainichi Shinbun on December 23, 1996. Yaguchi expanded
on those views in a speech at the Osaka Bar Association on March 9, 1998, which was published as the lead-in
to a special feature on hōsō ichigen in the July 1998 issue of Jiyū to Seigi.
160
See KOBAYASHI, supra note 107, at 161–62.
161
See id.
156
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Many proponents sought to tie expansion in the size of the legal
profession to hōsō ichigen. As we have seen, calls for a substantial rise in the
number of bar exam passers dated back at least as far as the Investigation
Committee’s recommendations in 1964.162 The bar initially refused to engage
in discussions of the issue. As pressure rose over the years, the bar continued
to resist, and then engaged in a series of grudging concessions. Indeed, it was
that recalcitrant attitude, above all, that led to the decision to limit the legal
profession’s representation on the JSRC.163 When the pressure continued to
intensify in the 1990s, members of the bar sought to treat agreement to hōsō
ichigen as a quid pro quo for concessions to increases in the number of bar
exam passers.164
The lawyer representative on the JSRC was Nakabō. He sought to link
debates over the size of the legal profession and reforms to the legal training
system with hōsō ichigen.165 Other Council members expressed skepticism
about the feasibility and desirability of moving to a system in which judges
would come only from among experienced lawyers. 166 Then, when it
appeared the deliberations might become deadlocked, during an all-day
session in August 2000, Nakabō stated in essence that the term hōsō ichigen
was just a slogan. He also posited that use of the phrase easily could lead to
the misapprehension that all lawyers would become judges or that lawyers
would choose all the judges, and that it would be better if some new word
could be devised that would not have the baggage associated with hōsō
ichigen.167
Some members of the bar seem to regard Nakabō as a traitor for having
made that concession. In subsequent years some of the attacks on the increase
in the size of the legal profession have cited hōsō ichigen, implying that the bar
was misled into supporting the increased number of passers by the false
expectation of achieving hōsō ichigen in return.168 However, in the context of
the JSRC, Nakabo’s concession cleared the way forward. Previously,
See supra notes 87, 96–97 and accompanying text.
See KOBAYASHI, supra note 107 at 80–118 (providing a detailed examination of the debates within
the bar and the impact of the bar’s recalcitrance on outside opinions).
164
See id. at 162, 167–70, 200–12.
165
See id. at 200–12.
166
See id.
167
See JSRC, Minutes for the 3rd Day of Concentrated Deliberations (2000),
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/natu/natu3gijiroku.html.
168
See, e.g., Kuboi Kazumasa (久保井一匡), Chokusetsushugi/Kōtōshugi o Kōtai Saseru na (直接主
義・口頭主義を後退させるな) [Do Not Let The Principles of Directness and Orality Regress], RONKYŪ
JURISUTO NO. 2 at 99 (2012); KOBAYASHI, supra note 107, at 214, 220.
162
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members had undertaken discussion of qualities desired for judges;169 after
Nakabo’s statement, the Council proceeded to discuss how best to achieve its
vision for the judiciary, given the realities of the Japanese situation.170 In the
words of Takeshita Morio, a former judge who served as Vice Chair of the
JSRC and also was co-author of the leading treatise on the judiciary:171
In our Council, from the start of discussions on reforms to the
judge system, nearly all of us were in agreement that the focus of
our deliberations should be on how to appoint and train high
quality judges who will be the bearers of the Japanese justice
system in the 21st century, and that the old way of framing the
question as simply a debate over whether or not to adopt hōsō
ichigen was not appropriate.172
The JSRC did not call for abolition of the assistant judge system or a
wholesale move to appointment only of experienced lawyers. To the contrary,
the Council expressly recognized that appointment of assistant judges directly
upon completion of the LTRI would continue to constitute a major route for
entry into the judiciary. Nonetheless, the Council’s final report strongly
endorsed the goal of diversification through its use of phrases such as
“form[ing] and nurtur[ing] a justice system that can genuinely meet the
public’s expectations and trust” 173 and references to the importance of
securing judges “with abundant, diversified knowledge and experience.”174
To achieve these ends, the JSRC set forth two major recommendations.
Notably, the first reform, was not increased appointment of practicing lawyers
to the bench. To the contrary, the first reform proposed a mechanism to ensure
career judges gained broader exposure outside of the judiciary. This proposal
paralleled and expanded on the efforts spearheaded by Yaguchi in the 1970s
and 1980s to have judges spend periods of time outside the judiciary,
169
See JSRC, Minutes for the 2nd Day of Concentrated Deliberations (2000),
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/natu/natu2gijiroku.html.
170
By being designated as an aide to a JSRC member, I had the opportunity to attend the all-day meeting
where Nakabō made that statement. Even though at that time I was not fully steeped in the history of the hōsō
ichigen debate, I could sense a hush and a collective sense of relief among other members of the Council when
he did so.
171
KANEKO & TAKESHITA, supra note 22.
172
SATŌ KŌJI (佐藤幸治), TAKESHITA MORIO (竹下守夫) & INOUYE MASAHITO (井上正仁), SHIHŌ
SEIDO KAIKAKU (司法制度改革) [JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM] 293–94 (2002) [hereinafter J USTICE SYSTEM
REFORM].
173
JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, Ch. III.
174
Id. at Ch. III, pt. 5, § 1.
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experiencing other settings. The fact that the Council listed this reform first
presumably reflected its view that the existing career system has many
strengths, and that the system for appointing practicing lawyers as judges
would not expand rapidly. In concrete terms, the JSRC called for the
establishment of a system “to ensure . . . that, in principle, all assistant judges”
would “leave their status as judges . . . for a reasonably long period suited to
obtaining meaningful experience” and “gather diversified experience as legal
professionals in positions other than the judiciary . . . , such as lawyer, public
prosecutor, etc.” before returning to the judiciary.175
There was a difference of opinion as to how long the “reasonably long
period” should last. According to one view, about five years would be
appropriate. While that clearly was a minority view, there was strong support
for the view that six months or one year would be too short.176 If the period
were that short, the JSRC members agreed, the assistant judges would end up
just being treated as “guests.” 177 Opinions also differed on what should
qualify as appropriate experience outside the judiciary. As noted above, the
JSRC recommendations called for “diversified experience as legal
professionals,” with specific reference to positions “such as lawyer, public
prosecutor, etc.” The same paragraph went on to say: “In addition, experience
of other types that is considered equally beneficial, in elevating the quality of
judges, to the types of experiences described above may also be included, but
further consideration must be given to the specific contents of such other types
of experiences.”178 As an example of one of the other types of experiences that
might be considered, Takeshita expressed the view that, especially given the
rise in internationalization, study at an overseas university should count as
appropriate “diversified experience.”179
One other aspect of the recommendation that bears note is the JSRC’s
call for the judiciary to “systematically ensure” assistant judges gather
diversified experience outside the judiciary. The Council stated, “such steps
might be considered as reexamining the criteria for appointment of judges or
placing weight on these types of experience in selecting judges . . . In any
event, effective measures shall be established.”180
175
176
177
178
179
180

Id. at Ch. III, pt. 5, § 1(1)a(a).
JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM, supra note 172, at 300 (comment by Satō).
Id. at 299.
JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, Ch. III, pt. 5, § 1(1)a(a).
JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM, supra note 172, at 301 (comment by Takeshita).
JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, Ch. III, pt. 5, § 1(1)a(a).
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The second reform proposal listed was invigoration of the system for
appointing judges from among experienced attorneys. In this regard, the
Council stated:
In order to realize the import of Article 42 of the Courts Act,
which anticipates that judges will be drawn from a variety of
sources, and to respond to the substantial increases in the number
of judges needed . . . it is necessary to promote strongly the
appointment of lawyers as judges, which has long been overdue.
For this it is indispensable that the Supreme Court and JFBA
build a constant and close cooperative framework. 181
The Council made clear that its concept of diversification of appointments
extended broadly, adding: “[I]t goes without saying that, based upon the spirit
of diversification of the sources of supply for judges in Article 42 of the Courts
Act, it is desirable that appointment not be limited to assistant judges and
lawyers but include vigorous appointment of public prosecutors and legal
scholars, who also are legal professionals.”182
From a United States perspective, it is intriguing to see that the Council
suggested a third category of reform that might have helped diversify the
judiciary: institution of a “research clerk system” at the High Court and
District Court levels, along the lines of the United States judicial clerk
system.183 This suggestion did not go totally unnoticed,184 but it never was
implemented and appears to have disappeared from view.
In contrast, the Supreme Court and JFBA both expressed support for the
other two major reform proposals. As to the proposal for diversifying the
experiences of assistant judges, the Supreme Court noted the need to
overcome hurdles such as securing appropriate placement locations to receive
the assistant judges, handling the additional workload created by their
absence, and working out details on such matters as compensation and
Id. at Ch. III, pt. 5, § 1(2).
Id.
183
Id. at Ch. III, pt. 5, § 1(3) (“[F]rom the standpoint of building courts with firm foundations and at the
same time providing one mechanism by which those from outside the courts can obtain experience within the
judiciary, consideration should be given to . . . appointing qualified legal professionals and others with
learning and experience as a sort of law clerk attached to a judge (or judges) . . . .”).
184
See, e.g., Saitō Hiroshi (斎藤浩), Myōga Hideki （明賀英樹), Ogawa Tatsuo (小川達雄) & Aikawa
Yutaka (相川裕), Saibankan Seido no Kaikaku (裁判官制度の改革) [Reform of the Judge System], 52 JIYŪ
TO SEIGI, no. 8, at 74, 78 (2001).
181
182
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benefits. In early 2003, however, the Supreme Court announced that, once
these hurdles were overcome, following an initial implementation stage all
assistant judges would have the opportunity to spend two years gaining
experience outside the judiciary. 185 The Diet passed enabling legislation in
2004. 186 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court and JFBA entered into an
agreement to cooperate in arranging appropriate placements, as well as on
other aspects of the new system;187 the first placements in law firms began in
April 2005.188
The bench and the bar also both publicly embraced the calls for
invigoration of the system for appointing experienced lawyers as judges. Even
before the JSRC issued its final recommendations, the Supreme Court and
JFBA released a joint declaration confirming their agreement that “it is very
important to greatly increase the number of attorneys appointed to the
judiciary” and pledging to discuss and cooperate on efforts to promote that
goal, setting forth a long list of concrete measures to be discussed.189

Memorandum, Saikō Saibansho Jimu Sōkyoku (最高裁判所事務総局) [Supreme Court General
Secretariat], Hanjiho no Keiken no Tayōka ni tsuite (判事補の経験の多様化について) [Regarding
Diversification
of
Experience
for
Assistant
Judges]
(March
18,
2003),
http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/vcms_lf/80614006.pdf.
186
Hanjiho oyobi Kenji no Bengoshi Shokumu Keiken ni kansuru Hōritsu (判事補及び検事の弁護士
職務経験に関する法律) [Act Concerning Experience as Attorneys for Assistant Judges and Prosecutors],
Act No. 121 of 2004 [hereinafter Act Concerning Experience as Attorneys].
187
Memorandum, Saikō Saibansho, Nihon Bengoshi Rengōkai (最高裁判所、日本弁護士連合会)
[Supreme Court, JFBA], Hanjiho no Bengoshi Shokumu Keiken Seido ni kansuru Torimatome（判事補の弁
護士職務経験制度に関する取りまとめ） [Arrangement of Matters Relating to the System for Experience
in
Work
as
Attorneys
for
Assistant
Judges]
(June
23,
2004),
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/judical_reform/data/hanji_torimatome.pdf [hereinafter Arrangement
of Matters].
188
See Tokushū 1: Saibankan/Kensatsukan no Bengoshi Shokumu Keiken (特集１：裁判官・検察官
の弁護士職務) [Special Feature 1: Work Experience as Attorneys for Judges and Prosecutors], 59 JIYŪ TO
SEIGI, no. 12, at 9 (2008) (examining the system for placement of assistant judges in law firms). See also
Hamada Hiromichi (濱田広道), Bengoshi Shokumu Keiken Seido no Genjō to Kadai (弁護士職務経験制度
の現状と課題) [Current Circumstances of and Challenges for the Attorney Work Experience System], 59
JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 12, at 9 (2008).
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Memorandum, Saikō Saibansho Jimu Sōkyoku, Nihon Bengoshi Rengōkai (最高裁判所事務総局、
日本弁護士連合会) [Supreme Court General Secretariat, JFBA], Bengoshi Ninkan o Suishin Suru tame no
Gutaiteki Sochi no Teian ni tsuite (弁 護士 任官を 推進 す るため の具体 的措 置の提 案に ついて)
[Regarding the Proposal for Concrete Steps to Promote the Appointment of Lawyers as Judges] (2001),
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/kentoukai/seido/dai2/2siryou_sa-be1.html.
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Potential Facilitating and Impeding Factors: The Feeley
Framework

B.

As we have seen, prior to this recent set of reforms, Japan had gone
through at least five prior instances of diagnosis or conception of the value of
diversification of the judiciary, including at least two prior instances of
initiation and implementation of reforms. Yet each of the past efforts had
stalled. Was there any reason to think this time around might be more
successful?
To answer, let us begin by returning to Feeley’s framework. In his
Introduction, he identified numerous factors as potentially aiding reform
efforts. With reference to prior research, he posited that:
[P]lanned change is most likely to succeed in institutions where:
・highly trained professionals perform complex tasks
・authority is diffused and flexible rather than centralized
・duties are left ambiguous rather than formally codified in detail
・roles and mobility are flexible rather than rigidly stratified.190
These features presumably might facilitate reform by allowing
experimentation and innovation by highly trained and committed
professionals, with successful innovations then expanded. As Feeley noted, in
the United States “courts are not bound by rigid centralized authority, [a]
condition that facilitates initiative and fosters innovation.”191 He cautioned,
though, “courts are enmeshed in a web of rules that can be and often are
inimical to change. Those comfortable with current practices selectively
invoke these rules to impede change.”192 Furthermore, “because courts are
rigidly segmented, broad perspectives and system-wide thinking are
discouraged and innovation is stifled.”193
FEELEY, supra note 7, at 38; see also JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2 (referencing the
perspective developed by Jerald Hage & Michael Aiken in SOCIAL CHANGE IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS
(1970)).
191
FEELEY, supra note 7, at 38.
192
Id.
193
Id.
190
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As noted earlier, after undertaking a thorough review of several
concrete criminal court reform efforts in the United States in Chapter 6 of his
book, on Assessment, Feeley set forth an even longer list of impediments to
change. Feeley began by highlighting several impediments to even thinking
about change. He noted that reform efforts often arise out of a sense of crisis,
without a sense of historical perspective. He observed, “A historical
perspective shows that many problems have long histories and stem from
deep-seated and insoluble tensions, and that the typical stance of others is to
resist and adapt, not to embrace reforms.”194 In contrast, he stated, in criminal
courts in the United States “bold crusades are undertaken against
little-understood enemies, often fanned by an atmosphere of crisis.” In this
“crisis thinking” context, “[i]n order to mobilize public support, reformers
must offer dramatic plans that are both vague and simple. But these very
strategies that facilitate innovation undercut implementation.”195
Feeley next turned to another set of impediments: the role of outsiders in
the efforts at reform. Given the parallels and contrasts to the Japanese
situation, a somewhat extended set of quotes is warranted:
Given the lack of incentives for system-wide changes within the
courts, it is not surprising that innovations should often occur
from outsiders. Thus, another dilemma: those who are in the best
position to assess the needs of the courts have the least incentive
to innovate, while those who have the incentive do not have the
detailed knowledge.
If change is initiated from within one part of the court, it is likely
to affect the internal operations of that agency and only indirectly
the whole system. . . . Such changes are likely to have only
marginal effect on other court operations. But if a single agency
unilaterally implements a new policy that has system-wide
impact, then it is likely to be greeted with resistance and
adaptation.
In the long run, two factors reinforce each other and contribute to
the lack of innovation in the . . . courts. First is the need for the
various officials—even though nominal adversaries—to
cooperate . . . . Second—because the courts possess hydraulic
194
195

Id. at 192–93.
Id. at 192.
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qualities in which each component can effectively thwart changes
– is the lack of incentive to try to change.
If . . . justice officials have few incentives to initiate system-wide
innovations, then who does? People and agencies outside
the . . . courts . . . .
While outsiders may be able to transcend the limited perspectives
and incentives of those who work daily in the . . . courts, their
remoteness from the courts prevents them from understanding the
byzantine realities of the . . . justice process, and, as a result, their
efforts are often misdirected. Furthermore, they rarely have a
continuing concern with the problems . . . Indeed, success to
many outsiders means adoption, like passing a new law or
announcing a new ruling. Continuing interest and the authority to
deal with the many factors that can subvert new policies are
needed.196
Feeley next considered impediments to implementation of reforms.
Here, he highlighted three key problems: fragmentation, newness, and
premature judgment. He explains those problems as follows: “First, the
fragmentation of the criminal justice system facilitates judgments of success
even as reform efforts fail. Second, many reforms have sought to circumvent
the sluggish institutions by creating new programs, but these quickly become
part of the problem. Third, success of programs has often been declared
prematurely.”197
On top of all these problems, Feeley identified additional clusters of
issues relating both to the stages of routinizing the reforms and evaluating
them. As to the former, he stated: “It is rare to find an innovation that is
carefully initiated and even rarer to see one successfully implemented. But it
is rarer still to find a workable new idea well institutionalized.” 198 He
observed: “While innovations may be adhered to at the outset, once financial
reality has set in and the glare of publicity has declined, there is great incentive
to revert to old practices.”199 He added:

196
197
198
199

Id. at 196–97.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 201.
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Successful innovators are rarely successful administrators. New
programs experience a rapid loss of moral fervor: charismatic
spokespeople are replaced by bureaucrats . . . young and
enthusiastic staffs age . . . co-optation and adaptation become
necessary for survival. Concern for original goals gives way to
concern for organizational maintenance and the program
objectives of the new generation of administrators.200
Finally, as to problems with respect to evaluation, Feeley first pointed to
“lack of incentive.” He commented, “Proponents of reform have little
incentive to evaluate; they know their ideas are good . . . . Administrators fear
evaluation, a process that, if pursued honestly, must either hold programs to
their promises or reveal unpleasant realities.”201 He noted another similar
issue: “The more rigorous an evaluation is, the more likely it is to sound
inconclusive . . . . what is sound practice for the researcher is seen as
obfuscation by the policy maker, who wants simple yes or no answers.”202 He
further observed that, “New programs are subject to unanticipated obstacles
that can retard or derail them. Both programs and evaluations must be
flexible; but this flexibility in turn facilitates manipulation and distortion.”203
For all these reasons, Feeley reached a rather pessimistic conclusion,
stating:
Scholars are finding that many innovative programs fail in their
implementation. This book suggests that the picture is bleaker:
the causes of failure are found at every stage of planned change.
Often, failure is rooted in conception, in a fundamental
misunderstanding of the nature of the problem, the dynamics of
the system, the nature of the change process, and attention to
detail at the service delivery level. 204
Feeley continued:
The central and continuing obstacles to change in the . . . justice
system are fragmentation and adaptation, and there are two
200
201
202
203
204

Id.
Id. at 202 (emphasis in original).
FEELEY, supra note 7, at 203.
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Id. at 205.
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approaches to coping with them. We can seek increased
coordination, or we can devise a strategy that takes these
conditions into account . . . . The dominant approach taken in
reforms examined in this book has been the former, to seek
improvements through greater coordination and better
management. This approach can be called administrative.
Administrative changes try to impose a bureaucratic form on an
inherently antagonistic adversarial system . . . .
Perhaps the greatest danger in the administrative strategy is that it
will work, that it will transform a contentious and embattled
group of professionals into cooperative bureaucrats . . . .
In the short run, administrative reforms may appear successful,
but once institutionalized, they can easily become part of the
fragmentation that is the source of so many problems.205
C.

Potential Facilitating and Impeding Factors: The Case of Japan

How might these observations apply to Japan? To arrange suitable
placements for assistant judges to ensure they gain broader exposure outside
the judiciary requires cooperation by a broad range of other entities. That said,
the reforms aimed at diversifying the Japanese judiciary primarily involve two
major institutions: the judiciary and the bar.
Looking first at the facilitating factors identified by Feeley, both the
bench and the bar are composed of highly trained and committed
professionals. For the bar, other features of what Feeley described as
“institutions” where “planned change is most likely to succeed” also apply.
While the task of coordinating with the Supreme Court inevitably would fall to
the national body, JFBA, even that body is far from monolithic. The JFBA
presidency changes every two years and vice presidents, drawn from local bar
associations across Japan, change every year. Moreover, local bar associations
might (and did) develop their own systems and strategies for encouraging
attorneys to apply for the judiciary and for screening the candidates. So, on the
bar side, the potential for experimentation and innovation exists; and, through
symposia presentations and publications about the various efforts, other local
bar associations could learn from the successful initiatives.
205

Id. at 205–06.
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In the case of the judiciary, however, the other features of “institutions”
where “planned change is most likely to succeed” do not apply. Chief Justice
Yaguchi provides a striking example that individual initiative can play an
important role, even within the highly bureaucratized Japanese judiciary.
Although Yaguchi’s long and distinguished career and well-earned reputation
as “Mr. Judicial Administration,” not to mention his positions as head of the
Personnel Bureau, Secretary General, and Chief Justice, allowed him to take
such decisive action, he is far from representative of the judiciary as a whole.
In prior works, I have characterized Japan’s judiciary as a “nameless,
faceless” judiciary. 206 Japanese judges operate in near anonymity. Their
names may be a matter of public record, but their backgrounds and
personalities are almost completely unknown to the general public. This
relative anonymity, I have argued, is consistent with the dominant ethos of the
Japanese judiciary, an ethos of uniformity. Within the judiciary, great weight
is placed on respect for precedent, thereby helping ensure uniformity in
outcomes. Efforts also are made to standardize matters ranging from size of
awards and length of prison sentences, to opinion format, writing style, and
courtroom design. In accordance with the view (or myth) that the identity of
the judge does not matter, it is even accepted that judges may change midway
through trials.
Thus, within the Japanese judiciary, authority is not diffused and
flexible; rather, it is highly centralized. Formal codification of duties may not
be announced publicly, but one can be sure that within the judiciary there are
clear sets of norms judges are expected to observe. Failure to conform to those
norms may affect a judge’s future advancement and postings.207 Finally, roles
and mobility are not flexible. They change over time, as judges are assigned to
new positions, but the career system is stratified and roles for each position are
quite clearly defined. Given these features, one would not expect the Japanese
judiciary to be a hotbed for individual initiative.

This is the central thesis of a book in Japanese, DANIEL H. FOOTE, N A MO NAI KAO MO NAI SHIHŌ:
NIHON NO SAIBAN WA KAWARU NO KA (名もない顔もない司法：日本の裁判は変わるのか) [NAMELESS
FACELESS JUSTICE: WILL JAPAN’S COURTS CHANGE?] (Tamaruya Masayuki (溜 箭 将 之) trans., 2007).
Aspects of the thesis are discussed in Daniel H. Foote, Restrictions on Political Activity by Judges in Japan
and the United States: The Cases of Judge Teranishi and Justice Sanders, 8 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV.
285 (2009); Foote, Transparency, supra note 6; Foote, Recent Reforms, supra note 6.
207
See, e.g., Haley, supra note 22; J. M ARK R AMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF J UDGING IN J APAN (2003); J. M ARK R AMSEYER, SECOND-BEST
JUSTICE: THE VIRTUES OF JAPANESE PRIVATE LAW 206–21 (2015).
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Accordingly, most of the key features Feeley identified as factors
facilitating reform decidedly do not apply to the Japanese judiciary.
Nonetheless, in other respects, the structure and fundamental mindset of the
judiciary hold great potential for achieving meaningful reform, provided the
requisite will exists. This is a theme to which I will return below.
Before elaborating on that point, however, let us consider how Feeley’s
long list of factors impeding change apply in the case of efforts to diversify the
Japanese judiciary. On at least two prior occasions when the topic of hōsō
ichigen arose, in the immediate postwar era and the early 1960s, the judiciary
faced a serious shortage of judges, so in that sense an “atmosphere of crisis”
may have existed. And, as with Wagatsuma, over the years, many observers
have felt the bar’s advocacy for a full-fledged hōsō ichigen system was
offering the sort of “dramatic plans that are both vague and simple” that Feeley
referred to as characteristic of efforts by reformers to mobilize public support,
without sufficient attention to the difficulties in implementation. Even in
earlier cycles of the debate, however, considerable weight was given to
historical perspective. Historical perspective played a strong role in the
deliberations of the JSRC and the resulting recommendations. After all,
among the members of the Council, Nakabō himself had played a central role
in the bar’s efforts to promote hōsō ichigen/bengoshi ninkan in the 1990s, and
Takeshita was co-author of the leading treatise on the judiciary, which
included a detailed examination of prior reform efforts. One of the other
members, moreover, was a recently retired career judge (Fujita Kōzō (藤田耕
三), and the Council assembled a great deal of information about and received
testimony from many representatives of the judiciary.
As to Feeley’s observations regarding premature judgment, the
Japanese bar had witnessed so many prior efforts to promote the appointment
of attorneys to the bench that it was scarcely inclined to declare success
prematurely, to be satisfied only with unilateral pledges by the judiciary, or
even bilateral agreements between the Supreme Court and JFBA announcing
the adoption of a new policy or renewed commitment to reform. At the same
time, prior history had shown many examples bearing out Feeley’s
observations that “[n]ew programs experience a rapid loss of moral fervor:
charismatic spokespeople are replaced by bureaucrats . . . young and
enthusiastic staffs age . . . .” The bar and other observers, undoubtedly, were
well aware of the need to monitor progress and maintain momentum over the
long term.
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However, it is in connection with Feeley’s observations about
fragmentation that one finds the greatest differences between the situations in
the United States and Japan. As alluded to above, Japan’s judiciary is not
highly fragmented. To the contrary, it is highly centralized, with a very strong
administrative apparatus contained in the Supreme Court General Secretariat.
In many respects, relations between the bench and the bar are “inherently
antagonistic” and “adversarial.” Yet when it comes to the judiciary itself, there
is a firmly embedded bureaucratic system with deep historical roots. As
Miyazawa Setsuo has observed, “the [Japanese] judiciary, given its
long-standing tradition of a highly stable judicial administrative body centered
on personnel management, possesses very strong capacity to effectuate
policy,”208 provided the policy accords with the internal views of the judiciary.
Thus, the fundamental structure already exists for the Japanese judiciary
to undertake what Feeley labels as an “administrative” approach, “seek[ing]
improvements through greater coordination and better management.” The
well-established administrative apparatus enables the judiciary to undertake
careful investigation of matters from a system-wide perspective. Once the
decision is made to proceed with a new initiative, the judiciary can implement
that initiative on a coordinated, nationwide basis.209 Furthermore, in the event
the Supreme Court General Secretariat has put its weight behind a certain
initiative, there is relatively little fear that a rogue element within the judiciary
would “effectively thwart” the change. Accordingly, while in a different form
from the factors likely to facilitate reform highlighted in the United States
context by Feeley, the Japanese judiciary’s capacity to implement new
measures on a system-wide basis constitutes one possible reason for optimism
about prospects for meaningful reform.
D.

Concrete Facilitating Factors and Challenges for the Recent
Reforms

Miyazawa Setsuo (宮澤節生), Seisakushikōteki Gendaigata Soshō no Genjō to Shihō Seido Kaikaku
Keizoku no Hitsuyōsei (政策志向的現代型訴訟の現状と司法制度改革継続の必要性) [The Current State
of Policy-Oriented Contemporary Litigation and the Necessity for Continued Justice System Reform], 63
HŌSHAKAIGAKU 46, 64 (2005).
209
At the risk of conflicting with Matthew Wilson’s assessment in his article in this symposium issue, I
would offer the lay judge system as an example of a reform in which the Japanese judiciary’s extensive
planning efforts facilitated smooth implementation. In this connection, see, e.g., Daniel H. Foote, Citizen
Participation: Appraising the Saiban’in System, 22 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 756 (2014); WILSON, FUKURAI &
MARUTA, supra note 1, at 38–58.
208
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With that examination of the potential facilitating and impeding factors
in Japan as a general matter, let us now turn to a concrete examination of
factors affecting the recent reforms. In considering these matters, I will focus
initially on the second reform proposal, aimed at invigorating the system for
appointment of practicing lawyers (and other legal professionals) to the bench.
Under the rubric of hōsō ichigen or bengoshi ninkan, that had been the primary
focus of diversification efforts since at least the 1930s. The efforts to
invigorate such appointments have continued to receive the bulk of attention
by the bar and other observers since the JSRC issued its recommendations.
After examining that set of reforms, I will turn to the efforts aimed at ensuring
assistant judges gain experience outside the judiciary.
1.

Appointment of Attorneys to the Judiciary

Looking back to 2001, at the outset of the initiation and implementation
phases, one can identify various reasons for hoping that the latest reform
efforts might be more successful than earlier attempts to promote the
appointment of experienced attorneys to the judiciary. The first such factor is
the perceived strength of the commitment. As noted above, in May 2001, even
before the JSRC issued its final report, the Supreme Court and JFBA
announced their agreement to undertake discussions of concrete measures to
promote such appointments. After a series of meetings, in December 2001
they issued a joint statement setting forth concrete steps to be taken on both
sides. 210 Thereafter, JFBA and the local bar undertook a wide range of
activities to promote so-called bengoshi ninkan. 211 Major bar associations
sought to recruit attorneys willing to serve as judges and established
committees to review candidates. In November 2002, JFBA held a major
symposium, at which organizers proudly announced that arrangements had
been made for twenty attorneys to join the judiciary in 2003. They also set
forth projections that the annual numbers would rise steadily to 100 new
appointees by 2011, along with a simulation that, by continuing at that level
thereafter, by the year 2030 attorney appointees would constitute over 40% of
Compilation, Saikō Saibansho, Nihon Bengoshi Rengōkai (最高裁判所、日本弁護士連合会)
[Supreme Court, JFBA], Bengoshi Ninkan tō ni kansuru Kyōgi no Torimatome （弁護士任官等に関する協
議の取りまとめ） [Compilation of Discussions Regarding Appointment of Attorneys as Judges, etc.] (Dec.
7, 2001), http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/judical_reform/data/kyougi.pdf [hereinafter Torimatome].
211
The promotional activities included many symposia and other gatherings to promote bengoshi
ninkan and the publication of numerous personal accounts by attorneys who had entered the judiciary. The
JFBA even produced a promotional video extolling the virtues of becoming a judge, entitled Shimin wa Anata
no Saibankan Ninkan o Mattemasu (市民はあなたの裁判官任官をまってます) [The People Are Waiting
for You to Become a Judge] (shown at 7th meeting of JFBA Citizens’ Council, July 26, 2005).
210
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all judges, well on the way to true hōsō ichigen.212 The bar has continued to
undertake efforts to promote bengoshi ninkan ever since.213
There are several structural matters that point to potential factors in
expanding appointments of practicing lawyers to the bench. The first is a great
expansion in the size of the bar. Even though the JSRC’s vision of 3000 bar
exam passers per year, which was to have been achieved by about 2010, has
never been reached, the overall number of attorneys has more than doubled
since 2001.214 Accordingly, the potential supply of attorneys is much greater
than in the past.
The past two decades have also witnessed a great increase in large and
medium-sized law firms.215 As noted earlier, in the 1990s Nakabō and others
involved in efforts to promote bengoshi ninkan expressed hope that lawyers
from large firms would join the judiciary, since they would find it easier to
arrange others to take over their clients and staff and would have a smoother
path to returning to practice later. In their discussions in 2001, the Supreme
Court and JFBA also identified the rise in large firms as an important structural
factor for the same reasons.216
In terms of numerical factors, perhaps the most promising basis for hope
in the increased hiring of attorneys was the JSRC call for a “great increase” in
the number of judges. The Council concluded that the “insufficient number of
judges” was already a “serious problem.” Given the likelihood that litigation
would rise in the future, it observed, further increases probably would be
needed.217 Furthermore, it called for the phased elimination of the so-called
tokurei hanjiho (special assistant judge) system. Under this system, if
“specially designated” by the Supreme Court, assistant judges with over five
years of experience are empowered to exercise the same authority as judges.
This includes handling cases on their own, rather than just as a junior member
of a three-judge panel. 218 The system was authorized by law in 1948, 219
See Ōshima Hisaaki (大島久明), Bengoshi Ninkan no Gendankai to Kadai (弁護士任官の現段階
と課題) [The Current Stage of Bengoshi Ninkan and Issues], 61 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 8, at 10–11 (2010).
213
As one of many examples, in January 2008 JIYŪ TO SEIGI began a monthly series of reflections by
attorneys who had entered the judiciary entitled Bengoshi Ninkan no Mado （弁護士任官の窓）[Window on
Bengoshi Ninkan], which continues to run to this day, having now reached over 140 installments.
214
White Paper, supra note 154, at 30 (37,680 registered attorneys as of March 31, 2016).
215
See, e.g., Yasuharu Nagashima & E. Anthony Zaloom, The Rise of the Large Japanese Business Law
Firm and Its Prospects for the Future, in A TURNING POINT, supra note 3, at 136.
216
See Torimatome, supra note 210.
217
JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, Ch. III, pt. 1, § 2(1).
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Id. at Ch. III, pt. 5, § 1(b).
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originally as a “temporary” measure to respond to the shortage of judges. The
system soon became entrenched. Nearly all assistant judges with over five
years of experience have been “specially designated.” 220 As the Council
observed, eliminating this system would necessitate hiring more judges,
explicitly adding, “to accomplish this, appointment of lawyers and others as
judges should be promoted.”221
Apart from these numerical factors, several concrete measures
identified in the joint discussions of JFBA and the Supreme Court might have
appeared as facilitating factors.222 For example, the bar agreed to establish one
or more law firms that could assume responsibility for matters being handled
by lawyers who entered the judiciary and that could provide initial
employment for those returning to practice after serving on the bench. On the
bench side, the Supreme Court agreed to promote a variety of options for
attorneys entering the judiciary, including short-term judgeships; 223
judgeships for specialized fields, such as bankruptcy, intellectual property,
commercial matters, and family law matters (including the possibility of
short-term specialized positions); 224 and part-time judgeships. As to the
part-time judgeships, the Supreme Court felt constitutional concerns would be
raised by allowing practicing lawyers to handle actual trials on a part-time
basis. However, “given the expectation that the part-time system would
promote the system for appointment of attorneys as full-time judges,” the
Supreme Court pledged to investigate introduction of a system in which
attorneys would handle civil and family conciliation matters on a part-time
basis.225
In the 1990s, one of the concerns raised by the bar was that the
appointment process was handled entirely by the judiciary, with no third-party
Hanjiho no Shokken no Tokurei tō ni kansuru Hōritsu (判事補の職権の特例等に関する法律) [Act
Regarding Special Exceptions, etc., for Authority of Assistant Judges], Act No. 146 of 1948.
220
See, e.g., JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM, supra note 172, at 304 (comment of Satō).
221
JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, Ch. III, pt. 5, § 1(b).
222
The measures discussed in this paragraph were contained in Torimatome, supra note 210.
223
While using the expression “short term,” the Supreme Court insisted on a term of at least five years.
The JFBA pushed for three years, but the Supreme Court felt that would be insufficient, since it would
normally take at least two years to adjust. See Ōkawa Shinrō（大川真郎）, Saibankan no Kyūgen no Tayōka・
Tagenka (裁判官の給源の多様化・多元化) [Diversification of Sources of Supply for Judges], 53 JIYŪ TO
SEIGI, no. 2, at 30, 36 (2002).
224
Id. Presumably reflecting the sense that matters in these fields were becoming increasingly complex,
for the fields listed the Supreme Court seemed especially eager to recruit attorneys with specialized expertise
and seemed willing to accept short-term appointments of less than five years.
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involvement to ensure a neutral check. At that time, members of the bar
expressed the desire for representation by outsiders, including attorneys, on
the screening body for attorneys seeking appointment. 226 From that
perspective, the bar might have taken hope from another set of reforms
recommended by JSRC, reforms aimed at “reflect[ing] the views of the public
in appointment of judges.” 227 That set of recommendations led to the
establishment in 2003 of the Lower Court Judge Designation Consultation
Commission (“Judge Designation Commission”), which is charged with
reviewing candidates for appointment to the judiciary, based on lists of
candidates prepared by the Supreme Court General Secretariat. The
Commission, which lies under the aegis of the Supreme Court, contains eleven
members: two judges, two lawyers, one prosecutor, and six other “persons of
learning and experience.” 228
Even at the initial stage, one could point to a far longer list of
challenges to the efforts to increase appointment of attorneys to the judiciary.
On the part of the bar, no matter how firmly committed the leaders nor how
vigorous the promotional efforts, success in expanding numbers of applicants
ultimately depended on decisions by individual attorneys. For its part, the
judiciary, even if truly committed to the goal of recruiting more attorneys, was
unlikely to appoint candidates it regards as unqualified or questionable. Thus,
success in expanding the number of attorneys joining the judiciary depended
on ensuring a sufficient number of highly qualified candidates applied.
In that respect, despite the pledges of commitment by the leadership on
both sides, nearly all the earlier challenges persisted, including attachment of
attorneys to practice, doubts about whether a judicial career is truly appealing,
unease over allowing others to handle clients and pending matters, and
misgivings over the burdens and uncertainty of the appointment process.
Indeed, one concern that had largely been redressed in the 1990s came back
into play: the concern over the location of postings and the frequent transfers.
As noted earlier, to promote bengoshi ninkan, in the 1990s the Supreme Court
provided assurances that attorneys with over fifteen years of experience could,
if they so wished, insist on being posted to courts in or near the area where they
reside (to the evident displeasure of career judges, who regarded this as
unjustified preferential treatment).229 This was discontinued under the 2001
226
227
228
229

See Ōkawa, supra note 223, at 21, 23–24.
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agreement. As the Supreme Court explained, given the much larger numbers
of attorneys who would be joining the judiciary, many of whom would likely
come from the Tokyo and Osaka areas, if the preference was continued, most
career judges would effectively be shut out of positions in those locations.230
2.

Experiences Outside the Judiciary for Assistant Judges

The other set of reforms, aimed at ensuring all assistant judges spent
substantial periods of time in positions outside the judiciary, faced its own set
of challenges. As mentioned above, these included arranging sufficient
appropriate placements and working out details on compensation and benefits.
While not voiced publicly, it seems likely that another concern on the side of
the judiciary was the fear that, once assistant judges had experienced life in a
law firm, they might never come back.231 Yet another possible concern was
that the assistant judges themselves might resent being seconded to other
bodies. If so, their dissatisfaction might lead to resistance or reduce the
attractiveness of judicial careers.
Yet at the time this set of reforms was instituted, there were several
reasons for hope. First, the judiciary already had undertaken efforts along
similar lines, pursuant to Yaguchi’s initiative in the 1980s. Despite Yaguchi’s
initial fears, companies and other governmental ministries and agencies had
proven willing to accept judges.232 Another reason for hope was that, apart
from securing placements and working out details on compensation and
benefits, this reform lay almost entirely under the purview of the judiciary’s
strong centralized administrative organization. Ever since the Meiji Era the
Japanese judiciary has had a tradition of regular re-assignments and transfers
of judges. In the postwar era, transfers and other personnel matters have been
handled by the Personnel Bureau within the Supreme Court General
Secretariat. While in principle judges may object, in practice they routinely
See Ōkawa, supra note 223, at 37.
Relatively soon after the new system had gone into effect, I raised this possibility with a judge who
had been involved in the implementation efforts. He conceded there had been such a concern and said the
judiciary had been relieved when the two-year term of the first cohort sent to law firms ended and all of the
assistant judges returned. When I raised the same question recently with someone else, he said he was sure the
judiciary would never send an assistant judge to a law firm in the first place if there was any thought he or she
was the type who might be tempted to stay. Yet another informant, a partner at a prestigious law firm that has
received several assistant judges, suggested the need to monitor career choices for a few years after the
secondments ended. He had the clear sense some of the assistant judges enjoyed the law firm practice and he
raised the possibility that, while all the assistant judges likely would return to the judiciary immediately after
their secondments ended, some might elect to move to law firms within a few years thereafter.
232
See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text.
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accept the determinations of the Personnel Bureau.233 Thus, even if assistant
judges resented being seconded to positions outside the judiciary, they almost
certainly would abide by the decision.
One might think that assistant judges, rather than resenting the
secondments as an unwanted imposition, instead might welcome the
opportunity to experience a different environment. An additional reason for
guarded optimism lay in the JSRC’s admonition to the judiciary to establish
“effective measures” to “systematically ensure” assistant judges gather
diversified experience outside the judiciary. They suggested that this
experience be taken into account in personnel evaluations to determine
suitability for appointment as judges at the end of their ten-year terms as
assistant judges.234 The success, of course, depended on whether the judiciary
actually followed through in doing so. For this set of reforms, assuming the
judiciary was truly committed, it seemed likely realization would be
considerably easier than for appointment of attorneys: a two-year stint in
another position for an assistant judge early in her career, with a guaranteed
return to the judiciary at the end of that term, is far less momentous than the
decision to give up an established career as a lawyer to enter a long-term
commitment to the judiciary. And the Japanese judiciary, with its strong
centralized administrative structure, would be well positioned to
institutionalize the reforms.
E.

Routinization: Results of the Reforms

Now, nearly sixteen years after the Supreme Court/JFBA pledge for
cooperation, the new system is well into its routinization phase. The following
section will examine results for three separate aspects of the reforms: the
“part-time judge” system, appointment of attorneys to the judiciary (bengoshi
ninkan), and the system for ensuring assistant judges attain diversified
experience outside the judiciary.
1.

Part-Time Judges

The judiciary followed through on its pledge to establish a “part-time
judge” system. In 2003, the Diet enacted amendments to the Civil
Conciliation Act 235 and the Domestic Relations Trial Act, 236 authorizing
233
234
235

See, e.g., RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, supra note 207, at 10.
See JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, Ch. III, pt. 5, § 1(1)a.
Minji Chōtei Hō (民事調停法) [Civil Conciliation Act], Act No. 222 of 1951, art. 23-2 (amended by
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attorneys to conduct conciliation proceedings (court-annexed conciliation).
The judiciary commenced the system in January 2004. 237 Through this
system, attorneys, while retaining their law practice, serve one day per week
presiding over conciliation matters at district, summary, or family courts,
along with two lay members. The attorneys thereby occupy the same role
normally performed by full-time judges. The appointments are for two-year
terms, and may be renewed once. In addition to district courts in Tokyo and
Osaka, posts are available in sixteen summary courts and twelve family
courts.238 The key rationales for establishing the system were to strengthen
conciliation and to promote the appointment of attorneys to the judiciary. 239
Through this experience, attorneys would be able to experience judicial life,
and it was hoped that a substantial number of part-time judges would elect to
pursue appointment thereafter as full-time judges.
As a whole, this system has been a success. The judiciary sought thirty
appointees for the first cycle in 2004, and it was fully subscribed, with
twenty-eight more appointed later that year, and all available positions have
been filled since. 240 The judiciary initially envisioned that the number of
part-time judges would rise to about 100 within a few years.241 Currently,
approximately 120 part-time judges are serving and, as of October 2016, a
total of 484 attorneys had served as part-time judges.242
Act No. 128 of 2003).
236
Kaji Shinpan Hō (家事審判法) [Domestic Relations Trial Act], Act No. 152 of 1947 (amended by
Family Case Proceeding Act, Act No. 52 of 2011, art. 250) (which came into effect in 2013).
237
See, e.g., Kitano Kōichi (北野幸一), Hijōkin Saibankan Seido no Genjō to Kadai (非常勤裁判官制
度の現状と課題) [Current Circumstances and Challenges for the Part-Time Judge System], 56 JIYŪ TO
SEIGI, no. 4, at 11, 12 (2005).
238
See Booklet, Nihon Bengoshi Rengōkai (日本弁護士連合会) [JFBA], Bengoshi Ninkan Q&A –
Hijōkin – (弁護士任官 Q&A—非常勤—) [Q&A re Appointment of Attorneys to the Judiciary – Part-Time –]
(Sept. 2017), https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/publication/booklet/data/ninkan_qa_parttime.pdf
[hereinafter Q&A].
239
See Memorandum, Saikō Saibansho, Nihon Bengoshi Rengōkai (最高裁判所、日本弁護士連合会)
[Supreme Court, JFBA], Iwayuru Hijōkin Saibankan Seido no Sōsetsu ni tsuite (Bengoshi Ninkan tō ni
kansuru Kyōgikai no Kyōgi no Torimatome（いわゆる非常勤裁判官制度の創設について（弁護士任官
等に関する協議会の協議の取りまとめ））[Regarding the Establishment of the So-Called Part-Time Judge
System (Arrangement of Deliberations of the Deliberation Council on Appointment of Attorneys to the
Judiciary, etc.)] (2002), https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/judical_reform/data/sousetsu.pdf.
240
For these and other figures in this paragraph, see White Paper, supra note 154, at 143. As a personal
reflection, on a number of occasions during the twelve years I served on the screening committee for the No. 2
Tokyo Bar Association, there were more qualified applicants than positions available.
241
See Myōga Hideki（明賀英樹), Hōsō Seido Kentōkai (Saibankan sono ta) (法曹制度検討会（裁
判官その他)) [Expert Consultation Committee on the Legal System (Judges and Other Matters)], 54 JIYŪ TO
SEIGI, no. 8, at 18, 20 (2003).
242
White Paper, supra note 154, at 143.
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How successful the system has been in serving as a stepping stone to
full-time judicial positions, however, is a matter of interpretation. Over a
quarter of the attorneys appointed as full-time judges between 2005 and 2014
had first served as part-time judges. Yet that percentage is more a reflection of
how few attorneys have been appointed as full-time judges, rather than how
many part-time judges have gone on to full-time positions. During the first ten
years of the part-time judge system, only thirteen of the 350 that served went
on to become full-time judges.243

2.

Full-Time Judges

As the preceding paragraph suggests, the efforts to invigorate the
appointment of attorneys to full-time positions in the judiciary have
languished. Despite JFBA’s confident prediction that twenty attorneys would
join the judiciary in 2003, the first year after the renewed commitment took
effect only ten were appointed.244 Further, the projections that the numbers
would rise steadily from there, reaching 100 by 2011 and continuing at that
level each year thereafter, look ludicrous in retrospect. In 2004 only eight
attorneys joined nationwide, and that is higher than any year since.245 In 2010,
and again in 2015, only one attorney was appointed to the full-time judiciary;
cumulatively only sixty-seven attorneys joined the judiciary from 2003
through 2016, an average of fewer than five per year. 246 During that
fourteen-year period over 1400 assistant judges were appointed directly after
completion of their LTRI training. 247 The career judiciary remains firmly
intact.
3.

Diversified Experience for Assistant Judges

What of the JSRC’s call for “in principle, all assistant judges” to “leave
their status as judges . . . for a reasonably long period suited to obtaining
meaningful experience” and “gather diversified experience as legal
See Q&A, supra note 238, at 4 (25% figure calculated on the basis of 45 attorneys appointed as
judges between 2005 and 2014).
244
For these and other figures in this paragraph, see White Paper, supra note 154, at 142.
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
Figures calculated by the author. See Lower Court Judge Designation Consultation Commission,
http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/iinkai/kakyusaibansyo/.
243
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professionals in positions other than the judiciary . . . , such as lawyer or public
prosecutor”? Has that reform been achieved?
According to a summary set forth on the Home Page of the Cabinet
Secretariat, by 2002 slightly over fifty assistant judges each year commenced
experiences of one to two years outside the judiciary. This included about
twenty-five who were seconded to government ministries or agencies, about
twenty undertaking study abroad, about five undertaking training programs in
businesses, and two or three headed to diplomatic offices abroad.248 At the
time, assistant judges were not allowed to work in law firms. As mentioned
earlier, however, in 2004 the Diet passed the necessary legislation authorizing
assistant judges (and prosecutors) to work in law firms.249 Just five days later,
the Supreme Court Judicial Conference, comprised of all fifteen justices on the
Court, issued the following resolution:
The Supreme Court recognizes that, in order to secure
broad-minded judges endowed with diverse and rich knowledge
and experience, it is exceedingly meaningful for assistant judges
to attain diversified experience outside the judiciary . . . Based on
that recognition, up until now we have sought to bolster the
programs for seconding assistant judges to government bodies,
dispatching them to private enterprises, sending them abroad for
study, having them work in overseas diplomatic offices, etc.
With the recent passage of the [above act], a system has been
established for assistant judges to . . . experience work as
attorneys. Now that the necessary conditions have been
met . . . we set forth the following fundamental policy with
regard to diversifying the experiences of assistant judges:
Upon ensuring arrangements to handle the caseload, securing
sufficient appropriate settings to receive the assistant judges, and
working out the circumstances and conditions, we pledge to
provide opportunities, in principle to all assistant judges, to
gather diverse experience in such ways as through work as
attorneys, in government bodies, and in overseas diplomatic
offices, through dispatching to private enterprise, and through
(Heisei 14 nendo) Gaibu ni Dete iru Hanjiho no Genjō ((平成１４年度) 外部に出ている判事補
の 現 状) [Current Circumstances of Assistant Judges Who Are Outside (The Judiciary)] (2002),
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai17/17siryou_sai2.pdf.
249
Act Concerning Experience as Attorneys.
248
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study abroad.250
As mentioned earlier, on the same day the Judicial Conference issued
this resolution, the Supreme Court entered into its agreement with JFBA to
cooperate in arranging appropriate placements.251 The first such placements
began in April 2005.252
If one were to focus only on the numbers of assistant judges who have
spent substantial periods of time in law firms, one would likely conclude this
reform also has languished. Between 2005 and 2016, the number of assistant
judges who entered law firms under this program has hovered at about exactly
ten per year.253 With an average of some 100 new assistant judges per year
during that same period, the number of postings to law firms seems far from
the JSRC aspiration for “all assistant judges” to experience positions “such as
lawyer or public prosecutor.”
On further investigation, however, the judiciary deserves far greater
credit in this regard. During the deliberations of one of the Expert
Consultation Committees established to help turn the JSRC recommendations
into concrete form, the Supreme Court proposed that other types of
experience, such as study abroad programs and work in companies, should be
regarded in the same way as work as lawyers or public prosecutors; and the
Committee accepted that approach.254 When viewed in that light, it appears
the judiciary has come much closer to achieving diversified experiences for all
assistant judges than the figures for law firm placements suggest.
While the judiciary itself has not publicized detailed records of the
placements, an attorney based in Osaka has compiled extensive data on a wide
range of judicial personnel matters, 255 including the program to provide
diversified experiences for assistant judges.256 Among the materials available
See Judicial Conference Resolution, Supreme Court of Japan, Hanjiho no Keiken Tayōka ni kansuru
Kihon Hōshin (判事補の経験多様化に関する基本方針) [Fundamental Policy Regarding Diversification
of
Experiences
for
Assistant
Judges]
(June
23,
2004),
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai25/sonota1.pdf.
251
Arrangement of Matters, supra note 187.
252
See supra notes 187–88 and accompanying text.
253
See White Paper, supra note 154, at 143.
254
See Myōga, supra note 241, at 21.
255
See BENGOSHI YAMANAKA MASASHI (ŌSAKA BENGOSHIKAI SHOZOKU) NO HP (弁護士山中理司
(大阪弁護士会所属) の HP) [HOME PAGE OF ATTORNEY YAMANAKA M ASASHI (MEMBER OF OSAKA BAR
ASSOCIATION)], http://www.yamanaka-law.jp/cont11/main.html [hereinafter YAMANAKA HP].
256
See id.; Hanjiho no Gaibu Keiken (判事補の外部経験) [Outside Experience of Assistant Judges],
250
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through his voluminous blog is a document prepared in 2014 by the Personnel
Bureau of the Supreme Court General Secretariat, summarizing the
placements outside the judiciary for assistant judges that were scheduled to
commence in the following year.257 According to that summary, eighty or
more assistant judges were scheduled to commence experiences of one to three
years outside the judiciary. The numbers included about twenty judges
serving two to three year terms in the Ministry of Justice, of whom about ten
were in administrative positions and about ten more were serving as shōmu
kenji (prosecutors representing the government in civil and administrative
litigation).258 In addition, about ten were headed to two-year terms at law
firms, about ten to one-year terms at companies, about thirty to one- or
two-year study abroad programs (typically as visiting scholars), and several
each to other government ministries and agencies, overseas diplomatic offices,
legal assistance projects, and other bodies.259 In testimony before the Legal
Affairs Committee of the House of Councilors in May 2015, the head of the
Supreme Court Personnel Bureau reported even higher numbers, with about
fifteen assistant judges experiencing one-year terms at companies, ten in
two-year terms at law firms, and about thirty-five each in two-year terms in
http://www.yamanaka-law.jp/cont4/98.html [hereinafter Outside Experience].
257
Memorandum of the Personnel Bureau, Supreme Court General Secretariat, Hanjiho no Gaibu
Keiken no Gaiyō (判事補の外部経験の概要) [Summary of Outside Experience by Assistant Judges] (April
11, 2014), http://media.toriaez.jp/m0530/991339578643.pdf.
258
An explanation is in order with regard to the roles played by the judges seconded to MOJ. In terms of
formal title, judges seconded to MOJ (and, for that matter, most other government ministries and agencies) are
designated as “prosecutors” (kenji, 検事). In the postwar era, although the judiciary and procuracy were
separated (with the procuracy under the MOJ and judiciary under the independent Supreme Court), a pattern
soon developed in which every year some judges were seconded to the procuracy and some prosecutors to the
judiciary. That practice came to be known as hanken kōryū (判検交流, exchange of judges and prosecutors).
See Kisa Shigeo (木佐茂男), Saibankan no Senmonsei to Dokuritsusei (Ichi) – Nishi Doitsu no Jitsumu to
Hikaku Shite (裁判官 の専門性と独立性(一) －西ドイツの 実務と比較 して－ ) [Expertise and
Independence of Judges (1) – By Comparison to West German Practice – ], 40 HOKUDAI HŌGAKU RONSHŪ
(北大法学論集) 301, 302–14 (1990). Initially, only a few moved in each direction each year, but by the 1980s
the numbers on both sides had reached double digits. Id. at 307–10. While most of the judges seconded to the
MOJ served in administrative roles or as shōmu kenji representing the government in civil and administrative
litigation, some handled criminal prosecutions. For their part, most of the prosecutors seconded to the
judiciary handled trials. Id. The bar had long been highly critical of this practice, and in 2012, the practices of
seconding judges to MOJ to handle criminal matters and seconding prosecutors to the judiciary were
abolished. See YAMANAKA HP, supra note 255. Criticism of allowing judges to serve as shōmu kenji has
continued to mount; but, while an effort is underway to reduce the numbers, that pattern still exists. See
Shukkō Saibankan no Meibo oyobi Hanken Kōryū (出向裁判官の名簿及び判検交流) [Name List of
Seconded Judges and Exchanges of Judges and Prosecutors], Dai3no1 Hanken Kōryū ni kansuru Naikaku tō
no Tōben（第３の１ 判検交流に関する内閣等の答弁） [No. 3-1 Testimony of the Cabinet, etc., regarding
Exchanges of Judges and Prosecutors], available at http://www.yamanaka-law.jp/cont10/128.html (quoting
explanation by Cabinet, submitted to the House of Representatives on Feb. 12, 2016).
259
Outside Experience, supra note 256.
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other government bodies and in one- or two-year study abroad programs, for a
total of about ninety-five per year. They added that the judiciary was
continuing to seek to expand the number of placements available.260
Turning our attention back to the 2014 summary of placements outside
the judiciary, that document quite clearly was prepared and intended for
internal use. A member of the judiciary has assured me, however, that it is not
highly confidential. Rather, he reports, a document of the same type is
prepared each year and distributed to all assistant judges. As part of the
personnel process, every judge and assistant judge is required to fill out and
submit a “card” each year, containing a brief summary of such matters as
health condition, family circumstances, and desires, if any, regarding location
of placement for the coming year. In the case of assistant judges, the card
includes a section asking preferences regarding experience outside the
judiciary, with eight types of experiences listed plus a catchall “other,” and
with three choices for each: “desire,” “would not mind experiencing” (経験し
ても良い), and “do not desire.”261 The summary of placements scheduled to
commence in the coming year is prepared and distributed to assistant judges
annually, to provide them with information on the options available. As this
shows, the program for ensuring assistant judges attain experience outside the
judiciary has become a firmly established element of the judiciary’s personnel
policy.
This personnel system represents an important aspect of the judiciary’s
efforts to “systematically ensure” assistant judges gather diversified
experience outside the judiciary, as demanded by the JSRC. As mentioned
earlier, the JSRC suggested outside experience should be taken into account in
personnel evaluations to determine suitability for appointment as judges at the
end of the ten-year terms of assistant judges. The Supreme Court acted on that
recommendation as well. In deliberations at one of the Expert Consultation
Committees formed to place the JSRC recommendations into more concrete
form, the Supreme Court pledged to issue guidance on the value of this
experience and to instruct the Lower Court Judge Designation Consultation
Commission to regard this as an important factor in its consideration of the
Id. Labeled within as Dai3 Hanjiho no Gaibu Keiken ni kansuru Kokkai Tōben (第３ 判事補の外
部経験に関する国会答弁) [No. 3: Diet Testimony Regarding Outside Experience for Assistant Judges].
261
See Saibankan ni kansuru Jinji Jimu no Shiryō no Sakusei tō ni tsuite (裁判官に関する人事事務
の資料の作成等について) [Regarding the Preparation, etc., of Personnel Affairs Materials for Judges]
(March 1, 2012), http://media.toriaez.jp/m0567/833614436808.pdf. For the assistant judge card, see id. at
Besshi Yōshiki Dai2-2 (別紙様式第２−２) [Attached Form No. 2-2].
260

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

58

VOL. 27 NO. 1

suitability of assistant judges for appointment as judges. 262 References in
minutes of the Judge Designation Commission reveal that at least someone on
that Commission has been keeping tabs. In 2012, that member reported
running a calculation that showed over twenty-five percent of the tenth-year
assistant judges up for appointment as judges that year had not attained outside
experience.263 At the following meeting, a representative from the Personnel
Bureau explained that a variety of personal factors had affected members of
that cohort of assistant judges, and provided assurances that the percentages of
those who had attained outside experience were much higher for the following
year.264 Even allowing for the fact that some assistant judges experience both
study abroad and a second outside experience, one can infer that, with eighty
to ninety-five placements each year, the judiciary is coming close to ensuring
all assistant judges have at least one such experience.
F.

Evaluation
1.

Bengoshi Ninkan: Appointment of Attorneys to the
Judiciary

In retrospect, one may wonder why the proponents of bengoshi ninkan
felt the efforts this time around would be so much more successful than earlier
efforts. Here, let us briefly reconsider a number of the potential facilitating
factors identified earlier.
Level of Commitment: On the bar side, those deeply involved in
promoting bengoshi ninkan, of whom there were many, likely felt the level of
commitment was far greater than in the past. Yet looking back at the extensive
efforts spearheaded by Nakabō in the 1990s, the similarities are striking. So
too, I would submit, is the “rapid loss of moral fervor” in both eras— one of
the many challenges Feeley identified. On the bench side, while the judiciary
developed appointment procedures and undertook other activities to help
smooth the way for appointees, one does not get the sense that the judiciary as
a whole shared Yaguchi’s view that hōsō ichigen was the “most desirable”

See Myōga Hideki, supra note 241 at 21.
See Meeting Minutes, Supreme Court General Secretariat, Minutes of the 52nd Meeting of the Lower
Court
Judge
Designation
Consultation
Commission
(Feb.
20,
2012),
at
4–5,
http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/vcms_lf/806040.pdf.
264
See Meeting Minutes, Supreme Court General Secretariat, Minutes of the 53rd Meeting of the Lower
Court
Judge
Designation
Consultation
Commission
(July
5,
2012),
at
4,
http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/vcms_lf/806041.pdf.
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system.265 As of the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was a perception that
top LTRI trainees increasingly were opting for the large law firms, and the
judiciary presumably viewed bengoshi ninkan as a potential means for
attracting top candidates back to the judicial ranks. The major objective was to
improve the existing career system, not replace it. Given those circumstances,
it should not come as a great surprise to find limited “incentive to innovate” on
the part of the judiciary.
Size of the Bar: The great rise in the size of the bar has increased the
pool of potential candidates to enter the judiciary from legal practice. Given
widespread accounts of heightened competition among lawyers, one may
assume that a fair number of attorneys—especially struggling ones—would
welcome the opportunity to gain a stable position in the Japanese judiciary,
where salary levels are respectable.266 Needless to say, the judiciary has no
interest in hiring struggling lawyers, or even average lawyers. On the other
hand, the increase in the number of bar exam passers, together with the
perception of strong competition among lawyers, has made it easier for the
judiciary to recruit enough assistant judges from among high-ranking LTRI
trainees.
Rise in Large and Medium-Sized Law Firms: The number of large and
medium-sized firms has increased greatly. Even at those firms, however,
arranging for others to take over one’s clients and pending matters is not easy.
Outstanding mid-career attorneys, of the sort the judiciary would like to
recruit, are likely to have heavy responsibilities. For those attorneys,
moreover, there would likely be a significant salary differential if they were to
enter the judiciary.267 Just as in the 1990s, the anticipated rise in applicants
from large firms has not materialized.268
A more conspiratorial view of Yaguchi’s goal in espousing bengoshi ninkan is that he realized that in
order to attract significant numbers of attorneys, the pay level and prestige of the judiciary would have to be
increased greatly. KOBAYASHI, supra note 107, at 217–18. Viewed in that light, others in the judiciary
presumably would have agreed.
266
According to an estimate as of December 2015, judges at the age of 40 receive annual compensation
of somewhat over 10,000,000 yen (approx. $100,000 at current exchange rates), not including location
bonuses. For high-ranking lower court judges, annual compensation, including location bonuses, rises to over
20,000,000 yen. See BENGOSHI YAMANAKA M ASASHI NO HP (弁護士山中理司の HP) [HOME PAGE OF
ATTORNEY YAMANAKA MASASHI], Saibankan no Nenshū oyobi Taishoku Teate (Suitei Keisan) (裁判官の年
収及び退職手当(推定計算)) [Annual Compensation and Retirement Allowances for Judges (Estimate)],
http://www.yamanaka-law.jp/cont8/56.html.
267
See, e.g., Komaya Takao （駒谷孝雄）, Bengoshi Ninkan to Kyaria Saibankan to no Kyōzon (弁護
士任官とキャリア裁判官との共存) [Coexistence of Attorneys Appointed to Judiciary and Career Judges],
52 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 3, at 90, 91 (2001) (judge, writing as of time of reforms, concluding that judicial salaries
265
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Number of Judges: The number of judges rose gradually from 2001
through 2014, before dropping again in 2016. As of 2001, there were 2243
judges (excluding summary court judges). In 2016, the number stood at
2755—an increase of just over 500.269 This is considerably less than the JSRC
projections. And, as the bar is quick to point out, the rate of increase for the
judiciary is far lower than that for the bar, which doubled over the same period.
That said, there has been only a relatively modest increase in the average time
required for processing cases.270 In a related matter, JSRC’s calls for phased
elimination of the tokurei hanjiho system have not been implemented. This
stands as a clear example in which the judiciary reverted to—or, more
accurately, stuck to—old practices once the immediate pressure for change
had passed.
New Measures to Be Taken by the Bar: The bar did not follow through
on its pledge to establish one or more law firms to serve as a transition point
for attorneys entering the judiciary and then returning to practice after serving
on the bench.271 In nearly all cases, attorneys entering the judiciary have had
to make arrangements for clients, staff, and office-related matters by
themselves.272 In this respect, the fragmentation of the bar served as a barrier
to undertaking the coordination needed to establish such firms. 273
are stable and quite respectable, but income is likely to be lower than for outstanding attorneys). For estimates
of lawyer income, see Minoru Nakazato, J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, The Industrial Organization
of the Japanese Bar, 7 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 460 (2010).
268
One might contrast that with the situation for fixed-term appointments of attorneys to government
ministries and agencies, which were authorized by new legislation in 2000, also in line with suggestions by the
JSRC. As discussed further below, see infra at note 291, those positions are proving popular among attorneys
in large law firms. Among the noteworthy differences with judicial appointments, the terms are shorter,
typically ranging from one to three years; the government posts typically are located in Tokyo, so, at least for
attorneys at Tokyo firms, they entail no change in location; and, by enabling greater specialization with
exposure to cutting-edge issues, the future career benefits are much more readily apparent.
269
Figures from White Paper, supra note 154, at 48. The number of judges had reached 2944 in both
2014 and 2015, before declining again in 2016.
270
The average time for processing district court first-instance ordinary civil cases (excluding consumer
loan cases, which have become highly routine) rose from 8.5 months in 2001 to 9.2 months in 2014. See
Saibansho (裁判所) [Courts of Japan] July 10, 2015, Saiban no Jinsokuka ni kakawaru Kenshō ni kansuru
Hōkokusho (Dai6kai) （ 裁 判 の 迅 速 化 に 係 る 検 証 に 関 す る 報 告 書(第 6 回) [Report Regarding
Investigation
Concerning
Efforts
to
Speed
Up
Trials
(6th
report)],
at
4,
http://www.courts.go.jp/about/siryo/hokoku_06/index.html.
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See Ōshima, supra note 212, at 11.
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See id.
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In later years, JFBA did help organize a network of law firms to serve as transition points for
attorneys entering fixed-term positions in local government bodies. See Memorandum, Nihon Bengoshi
Rengōkai (日本弁護士連合会) [JFBA], Jichitainai bengoshi tō nin’yō shien jimusho Q&A (自治体内弁護
士等任用支援事務所 Q&A) [Q&A Regarding the Office to Assist for Employment of In-House Lawyers at
Local Government Bodies], http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/recruit/data/jichitainai_qa.pdf. The
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New Measures to Be Taken by the Judiciary: For its part, the judiciary
did not follow through on its pledge to establish new short-term judgeships or
specialized judgeships. 274 As a practical matter, one wonders how much
difference this would have made. It seems unlikely that specialists in
high-demand fields would have leapt at the chance to give up practice and
enter the judiciary.275 And, even without an express “short-term” judgeship, if
attorneys truly wish to return to practice after just two or three years on the
bench, there seems little way the judiciary could prevent them from doing so.
As discussed earlier, the judiciary did establish the “part-time judge” system.
Implications of that system are considered further below.
Let us turn now to a brief look at some of the major challenges.
Location of Postings/Transfers: As noted earlier, the bar’s confident
assertion that many attorneys would seek appointment provided the judiciary
with a convenient justification for ending the system allowing experienced
attorneys to request to be posted within commuting distance of their
residences. Thus the judiciary, with the consent of the bar, reverted to prior
practices. While the bar may have been so sure of its cause that it did not view
this as a major worry, it likely represented an important concern for many
potential candidates. For attorneys who have already established homes, the
prospect of having to move, potentially every three years, represents a
substantial barrier.276
Attachment to Practice and Doubts about Judicial Careers: Perhaps the
greatest challenge is simply that most successful attorneys enjoy their work
and/or do not regard judicial careers as especially appealing. 277 Much of the
reason for this, I would submit, lies in the basic ethos of uniformity and
anonymity in Japan’s nameless, faceless judiciary. Japan’s judiciary is a large,
reason for the difference is not readily apparent. It may simply be a product of a special sense of mission and
fervor on the part of those involved in the efforts to promote in-house lawyers in local government bodies.
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See Ōshima, supra note 212, at 11.
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Instead, to meet the perceived need for judges with specialized expertise in fields such as bankruptcy
and intellectual property, the judiciary appears to have sought to develop that expertise internally.
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As in the prewar system, art. 48 of the Courts Act provides that judges may not be moved to other
positions or courts against their will. Yet evidently based on concerns that asserting this right might adversely
affect future career prospects, judges routinely accept the transfers. See, e.g., Komaya, supra note 267, at 92.
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See, e.g., Meeting Minutes, Supreme Court General Secretariat, Minutes of the 10th Meeting of the
Lower Court Judge Designation Consultation Commission (Sept. 9, 2004), at 11,
http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/vcms_lf/806007.pdf [hereinafter Minutes of the 10th Meeting] (in response
to a suggestion that the judiciary try head-hunting to attract qualified attorneys, a member of the Commission
secretariat (from the Supreme Court General Secretariat) replied that the high-achieving attorneys the
judiciary would like to attract are the least likely to come).
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centralized bureaucracy, in which judges are expected to conform to
established norms.278 While it would be an overstatement to say that Japanese
attorneys all enjoy high levels of autonomy, successful attorneys of the sort the
judiciary would welcome are likely to have considerable independence. This
is a major reason JFBA has felt the need to conduct extensive PR campaigns to
promote the virtues of judicial service.
Burdens and Uncertainty of Appointment Process: One set of concerns
raised by the bar in the 1990s was the lack of transparency regarding the
standards by which candidates would be evaluated and the appointment
process. These were coupled with the concern that the appointment process
lay entirely within the Supreme Court General Secretariat, with no check by
neutral outsiders.
In fact, while highly abstract, in the 1990s the judiciary had set forth a
list of the criteria it regarded as important in evaluating attorneys seeking
appointment. Ironically, in 1998, shortly before the recent reforms, the
Supreme Court announced it was abrogating that list on the ground that
appropriate consideration involved a “comprehensive assessment of the entire
person,” which no list of factors could capture properly.279 In accordance with
another recommendation by the JSRC, though, in 2003 the Supreme Court did
establish the Judge Designation Commission. As mentioned earlier, that
Commission is charged with reviewing candidates based on lists prepared by
the Supreme Court General Secretariat. It considers candidates for initial
appointment as assistant judges, fresh after completion of LTRI training; for
appointment of assistant judges to full judge status; for the successive
reappointments of judges every ten years; and for appointment of attorneys to
the judiciary.
Under the current system, the process for appointment of attorneys to
the judiciary begins with review by a screening committee in the respective
local bar association. If that screening committee deems a candidate suitable,
Along these lines, see, e.g., Ogawa Tatsuo (小川達雄), “Nijūseiki no Shukudai” Hōsō Ichigen Seido
no Jitsugen e (「20 世紀の宿題」法曹一元制度の実現へ) [“Homework from the 20th Century”: Realizing
the Hōsō Ichigen System], 51 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 1, at 50, 60 (2000) (from reactions during “caravans” to
promote hōsō ichigen, even though a fair number of attorneys feel work of judges is appealing, they are
resistant to the closed nature of the career system under bureaucratic control).
It bears note that it is not as though attorneys lack any sense of what life as a judge would be like.
Apprenticeship training at the LTRI includes stints, ranging from two to four months (depending on when the
training took place), in both a civil division and criminal division of a court.
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it recommends the candidate to the Supreme Court. Authorities at the Supreme
Court then conduct a further examination and send the names of candidates on
to the Judge Designation Commission to have it assess for suitability.
As the bar had hoped, the Judge Designation Commission is composed
primarily of outside members. There are only two judges among the eleven
members, and the Commissions also includes two attorneys. Yet the results of
the Commission’s evaluation of attorney candidates have led to consternation
on the part of the bar. Over the fourteen years that the review process has been
in effect it has considered a total of 103 attorney candidates.280 Of those, the
Commission has deemed forty-eight suitable for appointment, but forty-five
unsuitable. Thus, it has rejected well over forty percent of the attorney
candidates, all of whom had passed the screening process by their local bar
associations. For purposes of comparison, over that same fourteen-year
period, the Commission deemed more than ninety-six percent of the
candidates fresh out of the LTRI suitable for initial appointment as assistant
judges, and also deemed suitable more than ninety-eight of the candidates
from within the career judiciary for appointment or reappointment as judges.
Needless to say, these results have further weakened attorney interest in
applying for the judiciary. For candidates, the application process requires
considerable time and energy, not to mention the burdens involved in
explaining to clients, finding other lawyers to take over pending matters, and
all the other steps for winding down one’s practice. Naturally, it is a great
disincentive to hear that, at the end of that long road, 40% of candidates are
rejected and then have to go back through the process of reestablishing their
practices—not to mention suffer the embarrassment of having clients and
associates learn of the rejection.
What, one might ask, are the reasons for these high rejection rates?
Here, we might refer back to Feeley’s observations that reformers from
outside the judiciary “rarely have a continuing concern with the problems . . . .
Indeed, success to many outsiders means adoption . . . [S]uccess of programs
has often been declared prematurely.” Has that been the situation in Japan?
Most decidedly not. The bar has continued to be actively involved in
promoting the appointment of attorneys to the bench. The bar recognizes that
The figures contained in this paragraph reflect calculations by the author, based on a review of the
minutes of the Commission since its establishment in 2003. Based on the minutes, over the past fourteen
years, seven more attorneys have withdrawn their applications. Further, there may well have been more
withdrawals at an earlier stage before the application was treated as officially having been made.
280
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the high rejection rates for attorney candidates have resulted in a vicious
circle, in which fewer and fewer qualified candidates are willing to take the
step of going through the application and review process only to meet with
rejection in the end. Accordingly, the bar has sought to ascertain the reasons
for rejection and clarify the standards candidates are expected to meet. Yet the
bar has failed in those efforts. The judiciary and the Judge Designation
Commission have steadfastly held to the position that assessment is made on a
comprehensive evaluation of the entire person, and will not reveal concrete
reasons for deeming candidates unsuitable. Indeed, when, a group of attorneys
conducted its own investigation and compiled a list of factors that seemed to
be reasons for determinations of unsuitability, 281 the Commission reacted with
outrage. It condemned the article in question, saying the bar’s efforts to
identify and categorize reasons for rejection would “give rise to suspicions
regarding breaches of confidentiality and . . . lead to a loss of faith in the
Commission.”282
As for the reasons identified in that article, the list is as follows:
1) Weak motivation/reasons for seeking to become judge: concrete,
positive motivation/reasons not communicated; halfhearted choice,
financial reasons;
2) Lack of capacity: lack of balance, cooperativeness; overly
aggressive speech; lack of appreciation for judicial duties;
3) Bad grades at LTRI (applicable only to candidates at assistant judge
level);
4) Others: Insufficient information (too few cases handled, etc.)283
Part-Time Judge System as Precondition for Appointment? Despite the
Commission’s expression of outrage at the effort to identify reasons for
rejection, as early as its tenth meeting, in September 2004, the Commission
itself highlighted the final item on the above list: the lack of sufficient
Kimura Kiyoshi (木村清志), Kakyūsaibansho Saibankan Shimei Shimon Iinkai Seido no Genjō to
Kongo no Tenbō (下級裁判所裁判官指名諮問委員会制度の現状と今後の展望) [The Current Status of
the Lower Court Judge Designation Consultation Commission System and Prospects for the Future], 60 JIYŪ
TO SEIGI, no. 10, at 22 (2009).
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For a more detailed examination, see Foote, Transparency, supra note 6.
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Kimura, supra note 281, at 24.
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information about attorney candidates to evaluate them properly. At that
meeting, as one means for securing sufficient information, a representative of
the Commission secretariat (from the Supreme Court General Secretariat)
suggested service as a part-time judge for two or, with reappointment, four
years. This, the representative explained, would give the judiciary and the
candidate alike ample opportunity to learn about each other, and would also
provide time for a smooth transition from practice to the bench.284 Ever since,
whenever the Commission has considered attorneys applying for the judiciary,
it has highlighted insufficient information and noted its encouragement for
serving as a part-time judge first.285
The part-time judge system is important in its own right. It has helped
strengthen the conciliation system and, for attorneys with the desire to fulfill a
sense of public service, it has provided the opportunity to serve in meaningful
roles within the judiciary. In terms of its significance with respect to
diversification of the judiciary, however, the part-time system, which
ostensibly started as a device for promoting appointment of attorneys, rather
rapidly transformed into a device for the judiciary to screen potential
candidates to assure their “suitability” for appointment. Viewed cynically, one
might suggest that what began as a tool to promote diversity soon became a
tool to ensure, if not uniformity as such, at least that the candidates will fit into
the career judiciary. Thus, one might view this as a classic example of
“co-optation and adaptation,” in which “[c]oncern for original goals [has]
give[n] way to concern for organizational maintenance.”
2.

Diversified Experience for Assistant Judges

Turning to the reforms aimed at ensuring assistant judges attain
experience outside the judiciary, given the JSRC’s call for “diversified
experience as legal professionals in positions other than the judiciary, . . . such
as lawyer or public prosecutor” (emphasis added), the subsequent acceptance
of the Supreme Court proposal to classify work in companies and overseas
study as “diversified experience” watered down the recommendation. Some
members of the bar are undoubtedly concerned that only ten of the eighty or
more assistant judges who undertake experience outside the judiciary each
See Minutes of the 10th Meeting, supra note 277, at 8.
See, e.g., Meeting Minutes, Supreme Court General Secretariat, Minutes of the 32nd Meeting of the
Lower Court Judge Designation Consultation Commission (Feb. 8, 2008), at 2,
http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/vcms_lf/806024.pdf; Meeting Minutes, Supreme Court General Secretariat,
Minutes of the 52nd Meeting of the Lower Court Judge Designation Consultation Commission (Feb. 20,
2012), at 3, http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/vcms_lf/806040.pdf.
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year work in law firms. This perceived imbalance is compounded by the fact
that at least twice as many assistant judges serve in the Ministry of Justice as at
law firms.
Yet, on the whole, the system for diversified experience appears to be
functioning well. Rather than a drawback, the fact that assistant judges are
experiencing a wide variety of placements, including companies and other
government ministries and agencies, might be seen as a strength. Those who
return to the judiciary following outside stints share their experiences with
colleagues. Upon their return, I have been told, assistant judges make
presentations about their experiences in a specially arranged meeting with the
other judges at the court to which they are assigned. When two or more
assistant judges assigned to the same court return at the same time, they give
their presentations together. This provides an opportunity to compare and
contrast their experiences. Presumably, many judges share their experiences
with colleagues both before and long after these formal presentations, as
well.286 It bears note, moreover, that the rather low number of placements in
law firms is primarily a reflection not of the wishes of the judiciary, but the low
number of law firms willing to hire judges—and to pay their salaries, which is
a condition of the system—for a fixed two-year term. The Supreme Court
would like to send more assistant judges to law firms, but sufficient
placements are not available. 287
As this reflects, one of the ongoing challenges for this system is
arranging appropriate placements. Despite the difficulties in expanding law
firm placements, though, it is clear that the judiciary has succeeded in securing
a wide range of placements in many different bodies. Apart from the study
abroad opportunities (thirty-seven assistant judges as of 2016)288, the single
largest receiving entity is MOJ, with approximately ten assistant judges posted
to administrative positions, and ten more as shōmu kenji each year. The prior
practice of seconding judges and assistant judges to handle criminal matters
was terminated in 2012 after longstanding criticism, and pressure is increasing
for termination of the shōmu kenji secondments, as well.289 Some members of
the Diet have also raised questions about the propriety of, and potential
See, e.g., Hamada Hiromichi, supra note 188, at 13–14.
Id. at 16.
288
See Gyōseikan Chōki Zaigai Kenkyūin no Meibo oyobi Hanjiho Kaigai Ryūgaku Kenkyūin no Meibo
(行政官長期在外研究員の名簿及び判事補海外留学 研究員の名簿) [List of Administrative Official
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conflicts of interest involved in, seconding or dispatching assistant judges to
other governmental bodies and private enterprises.290 In any event, despite
these isolated doubts, the Supreme Court remains firmly committed to
ensuring assistant judges attain meaningful experience outside the judiciary.
As another possible challenge, what do the assistant judges (and
potential new entrants to the judiciary) think? Do they welcome the system or
resent it?
At large Japanese law firms, the opportunity to go abroad for study, at
law firm expense, has long been regarded as a desirable perk for top-notch
associates. In recent years, moreover, associates at such firms increasingly
have begun to spend periods of one to two years seconded to government
ministries and agencies in their areas of specialization. I have collected
information and conducted interviews with several attorneys who have
undertaken such positions (through a fixed-term appointment system, which
arose from another set of recommendations by the JSRC); I have found these
positions are quite popular among elite young attorneys.291 I have been told
that this option has increased the attractiveness of law practice as a career
choice for outstanding students trying to decide whether to pursue the
bureaucracy or law. 292 From this research, my supposition was that the
availability of similar opportunities, through the system for outside
experience, might serve as a valuable tool for recruiting and retaining talented
assistant judges.
Based on an in-depth interview with a member of the judiciary who is
highly knowledgeable about the system for outside experience (and to whom I
have pledged anonymity), I have come to wonder whether that is the case. For
most assistant judges, as with elite young attorneys, the opportunity to
undertake study abroad is highly regarded, as is the chance to serve in overseas
diplomatic offices (although the latter opportunity is limited to just two or
See, e.g., Outside Experience, supra note 256; Dai3 Hanjiho no Gaibu Keiken ni kansuru Kokkai
Tōben (第３ 判事補 の 外部経験 に関する 国会答弁) [No. 3 Diet Explanation Regarding Outside
Experience for Assistant Judges] (May 14, 2015), http://www.yamanaka-law.jp/cont4/98.html (explanation
by head of Supreme Court Personnel Bureau Hotta Maya before Legal Affairs Committee, House of
Councilors).
291
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appointments in government bodies.
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three per year). As for the other placements, however, views differ widely
among assistant judges. A considerable number of assistant judges, my source
reports, are studious types who greatly value the autonomy and ability to work
on one’s own afforded by the judiciary. Assistant judges of that type are
sometimes resistant to work as part of a team or to be subject to routine
oversight by a supervisor, as is often the case with outside placements.
Provided this report is accurate, to my mind it constitutes yet additional
evidence of why diversified outside experience is valuable for the judiciary. In
any event, while the opportunity for outside experience may have less
significance for attracting and retaining strong assistant judges than I had
previously supposed, it seems highly unlikely to deter candidates from
entering the judiciary. For studious types who might not enjoy the outside
placements, the alternatives of careers as either prosecutors (who, in the
Japanese context, are constantly subject to careful oversight by supervisors) or
attorneys would not seem to be very attractive options; and a two-year
secondment, out of a judicial career of over thirty years, presumably would
seem like a small price to pay.
In sum, the system for assistant judges to attain diversified experience
outside the judiciary has taken firm root. The challenges it faces are modest,
and it seems likely to remain a standard feature of the Japanese judiciary for
the foreseeable future.
VII. CONCLUSION
Fifteen years after the advent of the most recent set of reforms, the
part-time judge system and the system for assistant judges to attain experience
outside the judiciary both have taken firm root. Yet what the bar viewed as the
centerpiece reform, the push for experienced attorneys to join the judiciary,
has languished. Thus, as an initial question, one might ask: So what? What,
after all, makes that reform so significant?
Over fifty years ago, attorney (and later Supreme Court justice) Ōno
Masao raised that question. In reflecting on the deliberations and final report
of the Investigation Committee, he observed that the attorneys on the
Committee had not been able to persuade the other members that hōsō ichigen
would be preferable to the career system. The argument, he noted, had
proceeded down parallel tracks, with the attorneys saying “the current system
is a bureaucratic system” and others saying, in effect, “what’s wrong with
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that?”293 Ōno himself offered a series of strong, concrete critiques of the
shortcomings of the career system.294 Yet for the most part, the debate has
proceeded down parallel tracks ever since. At least as far back as the
deliberations of the Investigation Committee, the concern has been raised that
the appointment of large numbers of attorneys, with their “overly
individualistic attitudes,” 295 might undermine the legal stability and high
predictability of the Japanese legal system, which many observers regard as
one of its great strengths.296 On the other side, observers have raised exactly
the same point to highlight the need for diversifying the judiciary, asserting
that the over-emphasis on legal stability and certainty has led the judiciary to
ignore or downplay other important matters.297 Proponents on the bar side
remain sure of the shortcomings of the career system, and many continue to
believe in the virtues of a system in which all judges would be selected from
among experienced lawyers. Outside the bar, however, many find the bar’s
assertion that all judges should come from the attorney ranks self-serving, 298
and most remain unconvinced of the need for a wholesale change in the career
system.
For its part, the JSRC adopted a middle-ground approach. Not only did
it accept the career system as an unavoidable reality, it effectively endorsed the
career system, recognizing that “assistant judges have become the primary
source of supply for judges” and that that situation would almost certainly
continue in the future. Yet the Reform Council took seriously the goal of
diversifying the judiciary. Despite its expressions of support for appointment
of attorneys to the bench, in view of the past history and the absence of any
new effective measures, the Council did not voice great hope for substantial
increases in such appointments. Given the realities, the Council adopted an
alternative approach: it placed primary weight on its call for assistant judges to
Ōno Masao, supra note 90, at 6, 7.
See id. at 7–9.
295
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attain experience outside the judiciary, putting that proposal first in its list of
recommendations. As we have seen, that alternative approach has taken firm
root and is well on its way to becoming a fixed feature of the Japanese
judiciary.
This leads us to a final question: What accounts for the difference in the
success of the two sets of reforms? Returning to the Feeley framework, there
was not a lack of historical perspective: the JSRC was aware of the history of
prior reform efforts and took that history into account in crafting its reform
proposals. With regard to efforts to invigorate the system for appointing
attorneys to the bench, one could point to various facets of resistance and
co-optation. One could also point to the lack of sufficient anticipation of the
burdens involved in the application process and the high rate of rejections for
attorney applicants. Yet, above all, the fact that reform has languished reflects
overconfidence on the part of the reform proponents. To paraphrase Feeley,
“They knew their ideas were good”; and they were so confident many
attorneys either would want to join the judiciary or would feel a sense of
obligation to do so to improve the justice system, they could not conceive of
the fact that the flow of applicants would start off weak and then decline to a
mere trickle.
In contrast, the success of the system for assistant judges to attain
experience outside the judiciary lies in the distinct difference between the
United States judicial system on which Feeley’s analysis was premised and the
Japanese judicial system. As we have seen, Japan’s is not a fragmented
system. Nor is it a system in which a “single agency” within the judiciary
might undertake a reform unilaterally, especially one that might have
system-wide impact. To the contrary, Japan has a highly centralized,
bureaucratic judiciary, in which the Supreme Court General Secretariat plays
the key coordination role. The approach Feeley labels as “administrative” is
by no means unusual for the Japanese judiciary. Quite the opposite, it is
standard operating procedure. Given these fundamental structural attributes,
and provided the requisite will exists, the Japanese judiciary is well suited to
undertake measures, such as the system for outside experience by assistant
judges, that can be planned and implemented internally, with only limited need
for coordination with receiving institutions and other outside bodies.
In closing, let me return to a final Feeley proposition: “Perhaps the
greatest danger in the administrative strategy is that it will work, that it will
transform a contentious and embattled group of professionals into cooperative
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bureaucrats . . . .”299 In the case of the Japanese judiciary, contentious debates
undoubtedly take place within the confines of the Supreme Court General
Secretariat, but the overall framework constitutes a largely cooperative
bureaucracy. Whether that constitutes a drawback or a virtue rests in the eye
of the beholder.
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